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NARRATIVE FEEDBACK IN SUBJECTIVE PERFORAMNCE EVALUATIONS: DO 
RATINGS CHANGE THE NARRATIVE? 
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Directed by: M. David Piercey and Jeremiah Wayne Bentley 
Several high-profile companies are leading the charge to remove subjective performance ratings 
from their performance management processes leaving only narrative evaluations. Using two 
experiments, I investigate the effects of the ratings on narrative evaluations supervisors provide. 
In chapter 1, I test theory on supervisor goal attainment to learn how simultaneously providing a 
performance rating affects the narrative evaluation supervisors provide to employees. In 
supervisors’ seeking of honesty and social cost reduction goals, I predicted the favorability of 
narrative evaluations to depend on the presence of ratings and the purpose of the performance 
evaluation. I used psychological licensing and process accountability theories to develop different 
expectations for the effects of ratings on narrative evaluations when the evaluation is used for 
coaching or for bonus purposes. Although I find minor evidence that narrative evaluations are 
more lenient when social costs are present, I fail to find support for the expected interactive effect 
of ratings and the purpose of the evaluation on leniency in narrative evaluations. I also provide 
some insights as to why these hypotheses were not supported. In chapter 2, I test theory on 
motivated reasoning to learn how simultaneously providing a performance rating affects the 
narrative evaluation supervisors provide to employees in the presence of directional goals. I 
predict and find that the favorability of narrative evaluations is influenced by directional goals, 
but the effect of those directional goals on narrative evaluation favorability is reduced when 





provides evidence that numerical ratings are less affected by directional goals than are narrative 
evaluations because of the precision and reduced ambiguity of meaning in number scales. This 
numerical rating then acts as a reasonableness constraint on free-form narrative evaluations which 
reduces the effect of directional goals on the favorability of the narrative. This study builds on the 
subjective performance evaluation literature by investigating the relationship between two forms 
of subjective evaluations: ratings and narratives. Also, this study provides important cautionary 
information to firms that have removed or are considering removing subjective performance 
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This dissertation contains the motivation, relevant theory, and documentation for two 
experiments seeking to understand the effects of numerical ratings on narrative evaluations in a 
performance evaluation setting. Chapter 1 documents the results of the experiment I defended as 
my dissertation proposal. However, as often happens in scientific inquiry, the results did not 
conform to my expectations. Unfortunately, the general lack of statistically significant results in 
the Chapter 1 experiment makes it difficult to understand whether the lack of results are evidence 
that the theory applied is not relevant to the setting or that the lack of results are evidence of 
experimental design issues. In a quest to understand the effect of numerical ratings on narrative 
evaluations, I took what I learned from the Chapter 1 experiment and designed a new study that 
investigates a variant of this primary research question with an experiment that addresses some of 
the methodological issues in Chapter 1. I document the results from this new experiment as 
Chapter 2. 
 The Chapter 2 experiment resulted in evidence supporting theory that numerical ratings 
do affect narrative evaluations in performance evaluations. I wrote Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 of 
this dissertation as independent manuscripts that can be read separately to allow the reader 
maximum freedom to read Chapter 1 or Chapter 2 independently, if so desired. However, if the 
reader is interested in a story of my lessons learned, reading Chapter 1 followed by Chapter 2 will 
demonstrate how issues identified in Chapter 1 were addressed in the experiment documented in 
Chapter 2. Readers will notice similarities in the motivation and theory used in Chapter 1 and 
Chapter 2 given the overlapping nature of the content. Overall, I hope this dissertation can be 
useful both as a set of independent manuscripts as well as a linear story of how I sought to answer 












 In the recent upheaval of traditional performance appraisal systems, some high-profile 
companies have removed numerical performance ratings from their appraisal process (Rock and 
Jones 2015; Silverman 2016). While the effectiveness of this shift is questioned by some 
proponents of ratings due to beliefs that ratings are useful despite having faults (Adler et al. 
2016), we don’t know how ratings (or the lack of ratings) impact the ever-present narrative 
evaluations provided to employees as part of the management control system. This practical 
dilemma facing companies raises an interesting question. How does quantifying a subjective 
performance evaluation with a rating affect detailed subjective narrative evaluations that 
traditionally accompany the ratings? Previous research on performance evaluation focuses almost 
exclusively on the performance rating as the outcome of interest, leaving the narrative evaluation 
under researched (Wilson 2010; Speer 2018). I perform a controlled experiment to fill this gap in 
practical and theoretical knowledge regarding potentially unintended effects of quantifying a 
subjective performance evaluation in a rating. 
 Subjective performance evaluations provide a way for firms to capture, store, and use 
information about employee performance that is difficult to objectively measure. Subjectively 
interpreting raw performance information into summarized evaluations can play a feedback role 
and a compensation-contracting role in firms’ management control systems. Although numerical 
subjective performance measures play a significant role in determining important outcomes like 
the administration of compensation contracts (Bol 2008), these ratings are not without issues. 
Leniency (i.e., overly favorable evaluations) when evaluating poor performers is one of the most 
commonly documented problems with performance evaluations (e.g., Jawahar and Williams 





inaccurate information to both employees and the control system which can compromise 
decision-making in the firm. Previous accounting studies have documented changes in leniency in 
performance ratings due to changes in the control system environment (Moers 2005; Bol 2011). 
While most of the literature on performance appraisal focuses exclusively on numerical ratings1, 
understanding leniency in narrative evaluations is important because these narrative portions of 
evaluations are known to be important to employees and can provide detailed information that 
employees can use to improve performance (Smither and Walker 2004). Also, for firms that had 
removed performance ratings, narrative evaluations are left alone as the formal evaluation method 
for employee feedback and provide the basis for subjective compensation contracting. 
 The debate over getting rid of performance ratings makes it clear that we need to 
understand the information that is transmitted to employees and decision-makers outside of the 
numerical rating (Adler et al. 2016). I use a goal attainment perspective to formulate expectations 
of evaluator behavior during subjective performance evaluations as recommended by Murphy and 
Cleveland (1995). Supervisors have at least two competing goals when completing performance 
evaluations: honesty and social cost reduction. Leniency is evidence of supervisors’ desire to 
reduce social costs associated with giving accurate, low performance evaluations (Jawahar and 
Williams 1997). I expect the ability to and strategies used to satisfy these two competing goals 
will be impacted by the mix of numerical and narrative portions in the performance evaluation 
and the purpose of the evaluation. Consistent with prior research, I expect narrative evaluations 
without ratings to be more lenient as the social costs related to the evaluation increase. While any 
social costs should increase leniency to at least partially satisfy the social cost reduction goal, the 
level of social costs should change depending on how that evaluation will be used. I investigate 
 
1Hereafter, numerical ratings will be labeled ratings. While the ratings specifically investigated in this study 
contain numbers, ratings can take many forms including those with and without numbers (Murphy and 
Cleveland 1995). A numberless rating could be as simple as a 3-category choice of needs improvement, 
meets expectations, or exceeds expectations. These types of ratings share many important attributes with 
numbered ratings including comparability and forced categorization and would be expected to result in 





evaluations used in their two primary purposes: compensation contracting and employee 
feedback. Consistent with prior literature, I expect the greatest social costs and most lenient 
evaluations to be for those used in compensation contracting because of the additional social cost 
of an employee’s compensation being affected by the evaluation (Jawahar and Williams 1997).  
When considering the impact of ratings on narrative evaluations, I separately develop 
expectations of the effect of ratings on narrative evaluations under the two different purposes 
since prior research suggests that rater strategies change under different purposes (Zedeck and 
Cascio 1982). For feedback purposes (e.g., used to coach an employee), the addition of a rating 
provides an additional communication method for supervisors to use to satisfy their competing 
goals of honesty and social cost reduction. Theory on psychological licensing suggests that 
supervisors may seek to obtain a license (i.e., reduce social costs) to better achieve the honesty 
goal of giving an honest, unfavorable evaluation of a poor performer (Miller and Effron 2010; 
Merritt et al. 2012). Due to the relative strengths and weaknesses of ratings and narrative 
evaluations (Rock, Davis, and Jones 2014), supervisors will use the rating to provide a favorable 
picture of employee performance, thereby obtaining a license to be critical and honest in the 
narrative evaluation. In summary, for evaluations with a feedback purpose only, this theory 
predicts the addition of a rating will reduce the leniency of narrative evaluations.  
For purposes of compensation contracting (e.g., used to determine an employee bonus), 
the fact that the evaluation will be provided to a downstream decision-maker to determine the 
compensation outcome for the employee alters the way adding a rating will affect narrative 
evaluations. The involvement of the downstream decision-maker will increase a form of process 
accountability for the supervisor’s evaluation (David 2013; Erdogan 2002; Lerner and Tetlock 
1999). Specifically, this process accountability will lead them to match the favorability of their 
narrative evaluations with their rating to give the impression that the evaluation was done 
appropriately. While the rating and written evaluation will match, the addition of a rating 





between the rating and the employee’s valued outcome (e.g., bonus). Narrative evaluations on the 
other hand require substantial interpretation and are difficult to compare across individuals 
making the link between the narrative evaluation and the employee’s valued outcome ambiguous 
(Speer 2018; Adler et al. 2016). With the increased social costs of giving honest ratings that 
clearly link to valued outcomes for the employee, narrative evaluations accompanied by a rating 
should be more lenient than narrative evaluations without a rating. 
To address my research question and test these expectations, I administer a 2x3 between-
subjects experiment manipulating rating type and evaluation purpose where graduate business 
student participants take the role of a supervisor at a hypothetical company and evaluate an 
employee’s performance. After each participant views a video of a moderately poor performer, 
they must fill out a performance evaluation for the employee. Since I am focused on 
understanding how narrative evaluations change under different conditions, all these conditions 
require participants to complete a narrative evaluation for the employee. The rating type is 
manipulated such that the evaluation either requires no rating or does require participants to rate 
employee performance on a 101-point scale. I manipulate performance evaluation purpose at 
three levels: compensation contracting (i.e., evaluation affects employee bonus likelihood), 
feedback only (i.e., evaluation used only for coaching the employee), and no purpose (i.e., 
evaluation is private, meaning it is not used in the performance management system nor shown to 
the employee). The dependent variable of interest is the Narrative Evaluation Favorability 
measured multiple ways using a manually coded global judgment of favorability, sentiment 
analysis using machine learning derived sentiment scores (IBM’s Watson), and the manually 
coded number of positive statements less the number of negative statements in each evaluation.  
 In my experiment, I expected to find public narrative evaluations (without ratings) are 
more lenient than private narrative evaluations with narrative evaluations used to determine a 
bonus (i.e., compensation contracting) being the most lenient. While I do find that public 





not find that narrative evaluations are the most lenient when used to determine a bonus. With 
regards to the effect of ratings on leniency in narrative evaluations, I find no evidence of the 
predicted interaction between the presence of a rating and the purpose of the evaluation. The 
results also suggest that participants did not attend to nor understand the manipulation of 
evaluation purpose. This may be an explanation for the lack of results in this study. 
 This study builds theory to contribute to the heated debate on the removal of performance 
ratings (Adler et al. 2016; CEB 2016; Cappelli and Tavis 2016) by investigating one potential 
impact of this trend. I expected to show that the presence of ratings has an impact on the accuracy 
of narrative evaluations. However, I fail to find to evidence of this effect. Based on my expected 
results, I had hoped to provide evidence that contributes to practice in multiple ways. First, I 
expected to find that narrative evaluations with employee incentives tied to them would be more 
accurate without a rating compared to those with a rating. For firms concerned about 
development of employees through feedback, I expected to find that narrative evaluations used 
just for coaching may be less accurate (more lenient) without a performance rating. Although this 
study did not provide evidence of this theory, the question of how ratings impact narrative 
evaluations remains an important and open question that should be investigated. 
 I also attempted to contribute to the research on subjective performance evaluation by 
deepening the collective understanding of factors that affect narrative evaluations. Subjective 
narrative evaluations have received very little attention in the performance evaluation literature 
(Wilson 2010; Speer 2018). This study describes an experiment with expectations that narrative 
evaluations are not simply qualitative representations of their quantitative counterparts. However, 
I fail to find evidence that narratives and quantitative evaluations are unique and are affected by 
evaluator goals differently.  
 I also extend the management accounting literature on performance feedback by looking 
into determinants of performance feedback rather than outcomes of feedback. While substantial 





(e.g., Hannan, Krishnan, and Newman 2008; Hannan, McPhee, Newman, and Tafkov 2013; 
Casas-Arce, Lourenço, and Asís Martínez-Jerez 2017), very little has investigated how managers 
determine what performance feedback to give. 
 Last, I contribute to the broader accounting literature on narrative communication (e.g., 
Li 2008; Asay, Libby, and Rennekamp 2018; Bentley 2019). These studies investigate how 
agents communicate with principals using narrative reports and how it affects the agents and 
principals. I extend the literature by investigating how principals communicate using narrative 
reports to agents. Specifically, I investigate how principals’ narrative evaluations of agents are 
affected by quantitative ratings. However, I do not find support for this predicted effect. 
 This paper continues with Section II establishing the background and developing the 
hypotheses. Section III and Section IV describe the methodology used to investigate the research 
question and the results, respectively. Section V concludes the paper.  
1.2 Background and Hypotheses 
1.2.1 Background on Subjective Performance Evaluation 
When performance is not easily objectively measurable, using observers of performance 
to subjectively evaluate the performance of employees provides essential information to the 
management control system. This subjective performance evaluation fills in gaps left by objective 
measures to achieve multiple roles of control systems (Demski and Feltham 1976). Subjective 
performance evaluation plays a role in compensation contracting through its use in performance-
related decisions like promotion, bonus allocation, and raise determination (Bol 2008). Research 
in management accounting has provided important insights into the use of subjectivity in these 
types of compensation contracting decisions (e.g., Bol 2011; Bol and Smith 2011; Chen, Jermias, 
and Panggabean 2016). Subjective performance evaluation also fills a feedback role in control 
systems by providing crucial information on employee performance for the employee to develop 
and better understand how their performance compares to firm expectations (London 2003). The 





objective feedback not influenced by supervisor subjectivity impact employee performance. 
Recent studies investigating this objective feedback include those on relative performance 
information (Hannan et al. 2008; Hannan et al. 2013) and absolute performance information 
(Casas-Arce et al. 2017). While these studies emphasize the importance of feedback in 
management accounting, they focus on information that is not subjectively generated by 
supervisors. Performance that is difficult to measure objectively will still need to be subjectively 
evaluated by supervisors to give employees the feedback they need. Thus, understanding 
determinants of subjective feedback is important because of its effects on employees.  
 While the past literature on subjective performance evaluation has focused almost 
exclusively on numerical performance information, narrative or verbal evaluations play an 
important role in control systems. In traditional performance appraisal used for compensation 
contracting, supervisors provide both performance ratings and narrative evaluations of employee 
performance (Gorman, Meriac, Roch, Ray, and Gamble 2017). The content of these narrative 
summaries remains a new and under-researched area of performance evaluation (Speer 2018; 
Wilson 2010) even though employees report paying much attention to the narrative feedback 
(Smither and Walker 2004). Narrative performance evaluations allow for richness and nuance in 
communication unavailable using performance ratings that can be useful to employees and 
decisionmakers. Given the importance of narrative feedback in practice and the recent removals 
of performance ratings mentioned in the introduction of this paper, understanding how narrative 
evaluations change with and without performance ratings used for either compensation 
contracting or feedback purposes is a timely and important question. 
1.2.2 Supervisor Goal Attainment in Performance Evaluation 
 To understand how performance ratings might impact narrative performance evaluations, 
I rely on the goal attainment framework of subjective performance evaluation presented by 
Murphy and Cleveland (1995). One of the important tenets of this framework is that supervisors 





in supervisor-subordinate relationships, supervisors also have goals to reduce social costs 
associated with giving honest but unfavorable evaluations to subordinates. Evidence of this goal 
to reduce social costs is apparent in one of the common behavioral tendencies of evaluators in 
subjective performance evaluation, leniency (Jawahar and Williams 1997; Moers 2005; Bol 2011; 
Bol et al. 2016). Leniency is the tendency for an evaluator to give an employee an evaluation 
reflecting better performance than would be expected given actual employee performance 
(Decotiis and Petit 1978). Managers are lenient in evaluations to avoid damaging relationships, 
having awkward or uncomfortable conversations, hurting employee’s promotion or bonus 
prospects, and experiencing retaliatory behavior from employees (Murphy and Cleveland 1995). 
These social costs are particularly potent for employees that are underperforming because honest 
evaluations for these employees are more likely to bring on these social costs. Giving honest 
evaluations to high performers is unlikely to incur these social costs since the honest evaluation 
would be received favorably by the employee. Since this paper investigates variations in leniency, 
I focus this theoretical development on the process of evaluating an employee that has 
underperformed. 
 Lenient performance information is a concern for both compensation contracting and 
employee feedback in the firm. For compensation contracting purposes, lenient evaluations of 
poor performers can lead to evaluation compression which makes it more difficult to fairly 
distribute contracted rewards and make other personnel decisions like promotion which can 
impact employee motivation negatively (Bol et al. 2016). For feedback purposes, lenient 
evaluations reduce opportunities for employees to develop and learn. Since performance feedback 
information has long since been thought to be useful for performance improvement (Kluger and 
DiNisi 1996), poor quality performance information has the potential to restrict employee 





1.2.3 Social Costs of Narrative Evaluations 
 While the literature on leniency in evaluations of poor performers has focused on the 
leniency of numerical ratings, many of the aforementioned social costs of honest evaluations 
would be expected to also exist for narrative evaluations even in the absence of ratings. Rather 
than provide completely honest narrative evaluations, I expect supervisors to balance the 
competing goal of reducing social costs by being lenient in narrative evaluations. Murphy and 
Cleveland (1995) suggest that inaccurate ratings are not necessarily evidence of an inability to 
accurately judge performance. Instead, it is evidence that managers have goals other than being 
perfectly accurate in evaluations. Thus, a private evaluation (i.e., visible only to the evaluator) 
devoid of social costs could be viewed as a benchmark of honesty and accuracy. Once social 
costs are applied to the setting by making it public and for use in the control system, I expect 
narrative evaluations to be lenient.  
 To the extent that managers have a goal to reduce social costs, leniency should increase 
with social costs. These social costs are likely to depend on what the evaluation is used for in the 
control system. Prior research on performance ratings finds that ratings used for compensation 
contracting (administration of organizational rewards) are more lenient than those used solely for 
feedback purposes (development of employees) due to the greater social costs of giving honest 
evaluations under compensation contracting (Jawahar and Williams 1997). Specifically, costs 
associated with harming or failing to help someone achieve a valued outcome, like a bonus, 
become important considerations when the evaluation is used for compensation contracting. I 
expect these higher social costs associated with compensation contracting to exist when 
evaluations consist of a narrative which replicates prior literature but with narrative evaluations 
rather than ratings. 
 In summary, relative to a private narrative evaluation benchmark, I expect a narrative 
evaluation used for either compensation contracting or feedback purposes (i.e., a public narrative 





evaluations used for compensation contracting to be more lenient than narrative evaluations only 
used for feedback purposes. This hypothesis establishes the effects of social costs on narrative 
evaluations without ratings. 
H1a: Without ratings, supervisors will provide more lenient narrative evaluations of 
employee performance when the evaluation is either used in compensation contracting or 
coaching rather than when it is kept private (no purpose). 
H1b: Without ratings, supervisors will provide more lenient narrative evaluations of 
employee performance when the evaluation is used for compensation contracting rather 
than used for feedback only. 
While H1a and H1b are straightforward predictions from existing performance evaluation 
literature, they help establish benchmarks from which to see how a numerical rating affects 
leniency. In the following subsections, I develop theory to explore how a numerical rating might 
affect the leniency of narrative evaluations. However, as described in the development of H1b, 
social costs and motivations for performance evaluation are different under different purposes. 
Literature on performance evaluation purposes from outside of accounting suggest that rater 
strategies are different when evaluations are used for different purposes (Zedeck and Cascio 
1982; Jawahar and Williams 1997). Given these differences, I develop expectations for the effect 
of ratings on narrative evaluation separately by purpose. 
1.2.4 Effect of Ratings on Narrative Evaluations – Employee Feedback Purpose 
 Since supervisors have competing goals of honesty and social cost reduction, an optimal 
performance evaluation would simultaneously and fully satisfy both goals. However, up to this 
point, I have established that at least some compromise or an attempt to satisfy the social cost 
reduction goal occurs resulting in lenient narrative evaluations. When I consider the role a rating 
might play in satisfying these goals, I present the possibility that the additional communication 





using the two communication methods. If this could occur, supervisors would maximize goal 
satisfaction by doing so. 
 Theory on psychological licensing provides a basis for why a supervisor may be able to 
better satisfy both goals simultaneously when an additional communication method is available. 
A psychological license is a person’s “perception that they are permitted to take an action or 
express a thought without fear of discrediting themselves” (Miller and Effron 2010, p116).  While 
moral licensing is a common form of psychological licensing, behavior need not be morally 
discrediting to require a license (Miller and Effron 2010). Psychological licenses remove barriers 
to taking a desired action. Since supervisors are concerned with how an employee will receive 
honest, unfavorable feedback, a psychological license to be honest and critical would remove the 
barrier and result in a greater ability to achieve the honesty goal. Research on psychological 
licensing through group membership provides some evidence that supervisors may be able to earn 
a license to be critical by being lenient in part of their evaluation. Specifically, relative to non-
group members, people identified as group members are licensed to be more critical of their own 
group members (Hornsey, Oppes, and Svensson 2002; Hornsey and Imani 2004). These people 
obtained the psychological license to be critical through their group membership and reactions to 
their criticism were more favorable due to greater perceived constructiveness of feedback. 
Similarly, I expect a supervisor to be able to earn a license to be critical and honest with the 
employee by establishing themselves as unbiased and “on the side” of the employee. I propose 
that they can achieve this by providing a salient favorable evaluation to the employee using one 
of the pieces of the evaluation. Doing so would allow the supervisor to give an unrestricted 
(psychologically licensed) honest evaluation using the other piece of the evaluation. While most 
of the early literature on psychological licensing focuses on behavior after people already feel 
licensed, research also finds that people proactively seek out licenses to remove barriers 





supervisors will seek out this license to be honest and it would be perceived as an effective 
license.  
 I expect managers to select which of the pieces of the evaluation, the rating or the 
narrative evaluation, to use to satisfy each goal by which piece is better suited for each task. 
Ratings provide summarized global judgments of employee performance and create strong 
emotional responses (Rock et al. 2014), while narrative evaluations provide the opportunity for 
detailed feedback that the employee can use to improve. Ratings’ salience and impact on 
emotions allow it to be an effective license to establish the supervisor as being on the employee’s 
side. The narrative evaluation naturally provides the most value in providing honest feedback 
since it can provide actionable information for the employee to use to improve performance 
which is the purpose of feedback and one of the motivators for the honesty goal. In summary, I 
expect supervisors to use lenient ratings to obtain a license to be honest and critical in their 
narrative evaluations. With this license, I expect narrative evaluations accompanying a rating to 
be more honest (less lenient) than narrative evaluations with no rating. 
H2a: When evaluations will be used only for feedback purposes, narrative evaluations 
accompanied by a rating will be less lenient than narrative evaluations with no rating.  
1.2.5 Effect of Ratings on Narrative Evaluations – Compensation Contracting Purpose 
 Subjective performance evaluations for a compensation contracting purpose have the 
additional social cost of affecting valued outcomes for the employee (Jawahar and Williams 
1997). For the evaluation to be used to determine this valued outcome it must become part of the 
control system and be used by a compensation decision-maker to decide on valued outcomes like 
allocating a bonus. I expect this information transfer to a compensation decision-maker to impact 
the way supervisors prepare their evaluations that include ratings. First, by transferring the 
information to a decision-maker, supervisors will be accountable to the decision-maker to do a 





accountability created by oversight depends on the context and information available to the 
decision-maker (Lerner and Tetlock 1999). Research on accountability bifurcates accountability 
into two types relevant for this study: outcome accountability and process accountability (Siegel-
Jacobs and Yates 1996; Lerner and Tetlock 1999). In the creation of subjective performance 
evaluations, outcome accountability (i.e., responsibility for outcome accuracy) is difficult to 
enforce since the decision-maker is unaware what an accurate evaluation outcome would be 
because he or she did not personally observe the performance. However, the decision-maker can 
attempt to assess process accountability (i.e., responsibility for process used to make a decision) 
by investigating whether proper decision strategies have been taken by the supervisor in making 
the evaluation. Since the decision-makers lack underlying performance information, they can 
only assess the appropriateness of the evaluation using the rating and narrative portion of the 
evaluation provided by the supervisor. Evidence from performance evaluation research suggests 
that narrative evaluations can play the role of satisfying process accountability by justifying or 
explaining the rating (David 2013; Erdogan 2002). Thus, different from evaluations used only for 
feedback purposes, supervisors will need to match the favorability of ratings and narrative 
evaluations to create perceptions that the evaluation process was appropriate.  
 Along with encouraging matching between ratings and narrative evaluations, the 
additional layer of communication to the compensation decision-maker will affect the social costs 
associated with the type of evaluation provided. Ratings and narrative evaluations have 
fundamental differences that affect their suitability for use in distributing compensation rewards. 
Researchers and practitioners recognize the inherent difficulties with using narrative evaluations 
as the sole basis of bonuses or promotion (Adler et al. 2016). Quantitative ratings are easier to 
compare between individuals than narrative evaluations which makes them the natural choice for 
administering reward contracts (Speer 2018). Narrative evaluations are free-form and require 
significant interpretation to be used for administering contracts or determining promotions. 





employee’s valued outcome is much more ambiguous than the causal relationship between a 
rating and the valued outcome. Since supervisors are concerned with incurring social costs 
associated with impacting employee’s valued rewards, I expect the social costs of being honest to 
be higher for ratings than for narrative evaluations due to the clear relationship between ratings 
and the administration of the valued outcome. In summary, a supervisor providing a rating will be 
pressured to be more lenient in the evaluation because of how clearly it will affect the employee’s 
compensation relative to a narrative evaluation by itself. Also, consistent with process 
accountability pressure, I expect the narrative evaluation to match the lenient rating. In summary, 
when evaluations are used in compensation contracting, I expect supervisors to provide more 
lenient narrative evaluations in the presence of a rating compared to when no rating is present. 
H2b: When evaluations will be used for compensation contracting purposes, narrative 
evaluations accompanied by a rating will be more lenient relative to narrative 
evaluations with no rating.  
1.3 Methodology 
 To test my hypotheses, I perform an experiment where participants act as supervisors 
with the role of subjectively evaluating the performance of an employee.2 Using a 2X3 between-
subjects design, I manipulate Rating Type at two levels (No Rating or Rating) and Evaluation 
Purpose at three levels (Compensation Contracting purpose, Feedback purpose, No purpose).3 I 
administer this experiment to 144 graduate business students at a large public university in the 
northeastern United States as participants4. Participants were on average (median) 35.5 years old 
 
2 This study was approved by the Institutional Review Board at the author’s institution. 
3 I collect data for three additional conditions (72 additional participants) for use in supplemental analyses 
to provide additional evidence of the theory proposed in this paper. Each of these conditions focus on 
ratings only and do not include a narrative evaluation. The three conditions are as follows: 1) Rating with 
Compensation Contracting Purpose, 2) Rating with Feedback Purpose, and 3) Rating with No Stated 
Purpose. These conditions provide benchmarks to investigate how ratings are changed when accompanied 
by narrative evaluations. 
4 Most participants (95.14%) received course credit for participation in the study. A small percentage 






(35 years old) and had an average (median) of 43.9 (24) months of supervisor experience. 79.2% 
of participants reported listening to music at least daily. With the combination of supervisor 
experience and high exposure to music, I believe these graduate business students are 
appropriately knowledgeable to participate in this study (Libby, Bloomfield, and Nelson 2002). 
1.3.1 Procedures 
 After accessing the study using a Qualtrics survey link, participants take the role of a 
supervisor in a hypothetical cruise ship vacation company. After reading basic information about 
the company, the participant learns they need to evaluate an employee’s performance from a 
recent cruise. The employee, Spencer, sings and plays music to provide entertainment for cruise 
guests. After being introduced to Spencer through a brief video, participants are instructed about 
the form the evaluation will take. Participants then view a 3.5-minute video of Spencer’s 
performance and can take notes on Spencer’s performance for use later when they fill out the 
evaluation form. After viewing the performance, they evaluate Spencer using the performance 
evaluation form based on their condition. Finally, participants answer additional questions to help 
me better understand why they behaved the way they did and to collect demographic information. 
1.3.2 Task Performance Video 
 I used a video of a musical performance as the performance for supervisors to evaluate 
for specific experimental design purposes. First, a musical performance is an inherently 
subjective task. Since subjectivity is at the center of subjective performance evaluation and is 
essential to the theory presented in this study, a highly subjective performance context like a 
musical performance is warranted. Second, real world performance evaluations are based on a 
rich set of information which allows for significant variation in narrative evaluations. 
Experimental instruments traditionally used for investigating variation in performance ratings are 
not sufficiently rich to allow for adequate variation in narrative evaluations. To balance the time 
constraints of participants and the richness of data to evaluate, I chose a task that is both brief and 





variety of aspects: audience interaction, vocal quality, instrumentation quality, song choice, 
mistakes, stage presence, etc. This task provides an effective and efficient means of testing the 
hypotheses. Last, music is a task that many people are familiar with. It can be difficult to find a 
sufficient pool of participants that are able to write intelligently about and evaluate performance 
on a specific task. Given the ubiquity of music, I was able to efficiently access participants that 
were reasonably equipped to write about an employee’s musical performance. 
To construct a musical performance that was appropriate for this study, I hired an 
actor/musician to be the employee, Spencer. Since my theoretical expectations require social 
costs of honest evaluations to be a concern to supervisors, the musical performance needs to be 
moderately poor for a professional musician. I hired a professional musician to perform a popular 
song with seeded mistakes in the performance (e.g., missed lyrics, piano mistakes, failure to 
interact with the audience). This professional musician was compensated for her acting 
performance and was also eligible for real bonus compensation based on the evaluations of the 
participants and the decision-making of the boss (see discussion of the Evaluation Purpose 
manipulation for more details). 
1.3.3 Manipulations 
1.3.3.1 Rating Type 
 Rating type is manipulated at two levels. Participants in the no rating condition, No 
Rating, are not required to provide any numerical rating in their performance evaluation. 
Participants in the rating present condition, Rating, are asked, “Please rate the performance of 
your employee, Spencer, on a scale from 0 to 100 based on your expectations for a professional 
performer at Riverboat Cruises Inc.”5 Participants respond on a sliding scale with a number from 
0 to 100 with labels at 0 (“Far Below Expectations”), 50 (“Meets Expectations”), and 100 (“Far 
 
5 While performance ratings can take the form of absolute or relative formats (like rankings), absolute 
ratings appear to be more commonly used in practice (Gorman et al. 2017). I use an absolute rating scale in 





Above Expectations”). In the Rating conditions, the performance rating scale is presented 
simultaneously with the narrative evaluation. The rating is at the top of the page and the narrative 
evaluation follows.  
1.3.3.2 Evaluation Purpose 
 Evaluation purpose is manipulated at three levels (Compensation Contracting purpose - 
Bonus, Feedback purpose - Coaching, No purpose – No Purpose). The compensation contracting 
purpose is operationalized by tying the overall performance evaluation to a bonus for the 
employee. In this Bonus condition, supervisors learn that the employee, Spencer, is eligible for a 
$50 performance bonus and that their evaluation will affect the likelihood of Spencer receiving 
the $50 bonus. Specifically, they are told the following, “This performance evaluation will be 
used in making promotion, bonus, and job security decisions, in addition to coaching Spencer. 
Specifically, Spencer is eligible for a $50 performance bonus. Your evaluation will be sent to 
your boss who will determine whether Spencer receives the bonus.” Participants in these 
conditions are also told, “Your evaluation will be sent to Spencer and your boss.” Although the 
cruise company is hypothetical, participants were told that the employee, the boss, and the bonus 
were real. After the experiment was complete, I sent all evaluations from the Bonus conditions to 
a real person6, the boss, who used the evaluations to decide whether Spencer, the singer in the 
video, received the bonus. After receiving all the evaluations from the Bonus conditions, the boss 
in this study decided not to award the employee, Spencer, the $50 bonus. 
The feedback purpose is operationalized by describing the purpose of the overall 
performance evaluation as just for coaching the employee. In this Coaching condition, 
supervisors are told the following, “This performance evaluation is just for the benefit of 
 
6 The boss in this study was a PhD student unaffiliated with this study. The boss did not personally know 
the employee, Spencer, nor did the real person acting as the boss have to pay the $50 bonus if the decision 
to give the bonus was made. The boss was simply asked to read the evaluations and decide whether 





coaching Spencer and will not be used in making promotion, bonus, and job security decisions for 
Spencer”. Participants are also told, “Your evaluation will only be sent to Spencer.”7 
 The No Purpose conditions require participants to provide a private evaluation of the 
employee. Participants are instructed the following way, “Your evaluation will not be sent to 
Spencer or anyone else at Riverboat Cruises Inc. Your evaluation will be kept private.” This 
condition is intended to capture a baseline for honesty in narrative evaluations by removing the 
presence of social costs. The performance evaluation has no indicated purpose since it will not be 
communicated to anyone. 
1.3.4 Dependent Variables 
 For narrative evaluations, participants responded to the following prompt, “Please 
provide a written evaluation of your employee, Spencer, based on your expectations for a 
professional performer at Riverboat Cruises Inc [Please write a minimum of 250 characters].” 
Participants were forced to write at least 250 characters to ensure that the text responses would be 
long enough to allow for measurable variation in the construct of interest. I use the narrative 
evaluations as the raw material to create the primary dependent variable.  
Since I am interested in understanding how leniency of narrative evaluations changes 
under different conditions, I focus on the construct of Narrative Evaluation Favorability. I 
measure this construct in multiple ways. For use in the primary analyses, I code each narrative 
evaluation while blind to experimental conditions on the same 101-point scale used in the Rating 
manipulation (0-Far Below Expectation, 50-Meets Expectations, 100-Far Above Expectations). 
This captures a holistic measure of the favorability of the narrative evaluation absent any rating 
information. In supplemental analyses, I use additional measures of Narrative Evaluation 
Favorability. As one alternative measure of the Narrative Evaluation Favorability, I use the 
 
7 To increase the felt social costs in this study, I mix both hypothetical and real elements into the 
experiment. While the cruise ship scenario is hypothetical, the impact of the supervisor’s evaluations on the 
employee is real. In all conditions other than the no stated purpose conditions, the evaluations were 





natural language understanding service from IBM Watson8. This service uses deep learning to 
analyze text and provide metadata including the sentiment score of the data. The sentiment score 
is bounded by -1 and 1 with higher numbers being interpreted as having a more positive 
sentiment. I use the sentiment score for each narrative evaluation as an alternative measure of 
Narrative Evaluation Favorability. As a third measure of Narrative Evaluation Favorability, I 
code the number of positive and negative statements in each narrative evaluation while blind to 
conditions. I then calculate the number of positive statements minus the number of negative 
statements for each narrative evaluation. This captures the overall favorability of each evaluation 
by counting the valence of the underlying contents of the evaluation. For all three measures of 
Narrative Evaluation Favorability, I interpret higher values as being indicative of more favorable 
evaluations. 
1.4 Results 
1.4.1 Manipulation Checks 
Before proceeding with the hypothesis tests, I check whether participants understand the 
Evaluation Purpose manipulation. Participants responded to two questions to capture their 
understanding of the Evaluation Purpose manipulation.  First, they respond to the following 
question with a “yes” or “no” answer: “Is your employee, Spencer, going to see the performance 
evaluation you provided?”. Second, they respond to another “yes” or “no” question, “Is your boss 
at Riverboat Cruises going to see the performance evaluation you provided and use it to 
determine Spencer’s bonus?” Participants in the no purpose conditions should answer “no” to 
both questions. Participants in the coaching condition should answer “yes” to the first question 
and “no” to the second question. Participants in the bonus condition should answer “yes” to both 
questions. Only 57.6% (83 out of 144) of participants correctly answered these manipulation 
check questions. The manipulation check failures primarily occurred in the no purpose and 
 





coaching conditions with only 23.4% (11 out of 47) and 65.31% (32 out of 49) passing the 
manipulation check questions, respectively. 83.33% (40 out of 48) of participants in the bonus 
conditions accurately responded to both questions suggesting that participants in these bonus 
conditions generally understood their evaluation type. Overall, the low success rate is a cause for 
concern when generalizing the results from this study. The presence or lack of results in the 
following sections could be due to participant’s lack of attention or understanding of the 
manipulations rather than evidence supporting or refuting the theory underlying the hypotheses. I 
present my analyses using the full sample of 144 participants.9 
1.4.2 Hypothesis Tests 
A graphical representation of my hypotheses is included as Figure 1. I first investigate 
my hypotheses using Narrative Evaluation Favorability as coded by me on a 0 to 100 scale with 
0 labeled as “Far Below Expectations”, 50 labeled as “Meets Expectations”, and 100 labeled as 
“Far Above Expectations”. I tabulate descriptive statistics of Narrative Evaluation Favorability 
by condition in Table 1, Panel A. I also graph the cell means in Figure 2. In Table 1, Panel B, I 
begin formally testing my hypotheses by documenting a two-way Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) of Narrative Evaluation Favorability with Rating Type, Evaluation Purpose, and the 
interaction as factors. As initial evidence of H1a and H1b, I find a significant effect of Evaluation 
Purpose on Narrative Evaluation Favorability (F2,138=5.840, p<.01). However, I do not find 
evidence of the interaction implied in H2a and H2b (F2,138=0.333, p=0.718). 
 I follow up the significant effect of Evaluation Purpose by performing the specific simple 
effect tests predicted in H1a and H1b. As predicted in H1a, Narrative Evaluation Favorability 
without a rating is higher in the coaching condition than the no purpose condition 
 
9 I replicate the primary analyses of the Narrative Evaluation Favorability variable with each of the three 
measures of the construct (Coded Favorability, IBM Watson Sentiment, and Positive Statements minus 
Negative Statements) after dropping manipulation check failures. In all three ANOVAs, neither 
independent variable nor the interaction between the two is statistically significant (all p’s > 0.38). 
However, given the large decrease in statistical power due to the reduction in number of participants, the 





(estimate=7.625, tdf=138=2.111, two-tailed p=0.037). Although directionally consistent with H1a, 
Narrative Evaluation Favorability without a rating is not significantly higher in the bonus 
condition than the no purpose condition (estimate=3.926, tdf=138=1.109, two-tailed p=0.270). 
Thus, I find mixed results for H1a. H1b is not supported as I find the bonus condition without a 
rating is directionally less favorable than the coaching condition without a rating although this 
effect is not significant (estimate=-3.699, tdf=138=1.044, two-tailed p=0.298). This evidence is in 
the opposite direction of the effect predicted in H1b. The findings show partial support for H1a 
and fail to support H1b. Since the interaction term in the ANOVA was insignificant and the 
visual fit of the predicted interaction is poor, I do not perform planned contrasts testing for H2a 
and H2b. H2a and H2b are not supported. 
 In summary, I find some evidence consistent with prior literature suggesting that 
introducing social costs leads to more lenient evaluations, in this case higher Narrative 
Evaluation Favorability (Jawahar and Williams 1997; Moers 2005). However, I fail to find 
evidence consistent with prior research that social costs are higher when compensation is 
impacted by an evaluation compared to when it is just used for employee feedback (Jawahar and 
Williams 1997). Also, I do not find evidence that ratings impact Narrative Evaluation 
Favorability and interact with Evaluation Purpose.  
1.4.3 Supplemental Analyses 
1.4.3.1 Alternative Measures of Narrative Evaluation Favorability 
As an alternative measure of Narrative Evaluation Favorability, I use the sentiment score 
provided by IBM Watson’s natural language understanding software for each narrative 
evaluation. I replicate the analyses in Table 1 using this alternative measure and tabulate the 
descriptive statistics, corresponding ANOVA, and simple effect tests in Table 2. I also graph the 
cell means in Figure 3. The results are similar to the findings for the primary measure of 
Narrative Evaluation Favorability in Table 1, although the results here are less statistically 





Evaluation Favorability (F2,138=2.555, p=0.081). Also, similar to the primary analysis in Table 1, 
there is no interaction effect between Evaluation Purpose and Rating Type on Narrative 
Evaluation Favorability (F2,138=0.038, p=0.963). Following up with simple effects tests for H1 in 
the absence of a rating, Narrative Evaluation Favorability marginally significantly increases for 
those in the coaching condition compared to the no purpose condition (estimate=0.189, 
tdf=138=1.413, one-tailed p=0.080), but Narrative Evaluation Favorability is not significantly 
higher in the bonus condition than the no purpose condition (estimate=0.084, tdf=138=0.639, two-
tailed p=0.524). This provides partial evidence of H1a with participants in the coaching condition 
without a rating having higher Narrative Evaluation Favorability than those in the no purpose 
condition without a rating. H1b is not supported with the bonus condition without a rating being 
directionally lower but not statistically different from the coaching condition without a rating 
(estimate=-0.105, tdf=138=-0.802, two-tailed p=0.424). 
In untabulated analyses, I analyze the Narrative Evaluation Favorability using the 
number of positive statements minus number of negative statements. Using an ANOVA, I find 
results similar to those documented in Table 1 and Table 2 with respect to my hypotheses. I find a 
marginally significant main effect of Evaluation Purpose on Narrative Evaluation Favorability 
(F2,138=2.947, p=0.056). I find overall evidence that social costs influence Narrative Evaluation 
Favorability but fail to find evidence that the bonus condition is more positive than the coaching 
condition. Overall, I find some support for H1a. I also fail to find evidence of a significant 
interaction between Evaluation Purpose and Rating Type (F2,138=0.518, p=0.597). Thus, I fail to 
find support for H2 with this alternative measure of Narrative Evaluation Favorability. Overall, 
across all 3 measure of Narrative Evaluation Favorability I find partial evidence of H1a and no 
evidence supporting H1b, H2a, nor H2b. 
1.4.3.2 Process Measures 
Although I generally did not find evidence supporting my hypotheses, it is possible that 





theory. I ask participants to indicate how motivated they were to be nice and honest in each piece 
of their performance evaluation on a scale from 0 (Not at all motivated) to 10 (Completely 
motivated). First, I ask them about their motivations for their narrative evaluation, then if 
applicable, I ask them about their motivations for their rating evaluation. These questions provide 
some insight about the use of each piece of the performance evaluation to satisfy honesty and 
social cost reduction goals. Since I expect the supervisor’s motivation to satisfy these goals to 
differ by condition, I perform two separate untabulated ANOVA on the two motivation questions 
for the narrative evaluations with Evaluation Purpose, Rating Type, and the interaction between 
the two as factors. I fail to find any significant effects of the factors on either motivation to be 
honest or motivation to be nice in the narrative (all p’s > 0.28). I also perform two untabulated 
ANOVA on the two motivation questions for the ratings with Evaluation Purpose as the factor. I 
fail to find evidence that the motivation to achieve either the goal to be nice or the goal to be 
honest in the ratings differ between conditions (all p’s > 0.62). These results provide some 
evidence that the manipulations in the study failed to affect the motivation to accomplish the 
goals predicted in the study.  
I also investigate whether Narrative Evaluation Favorability is related to the participants’ 
reported motivations to be nice or honest in the narrative evaluation. Using untabulated simple 
linear regression, I find evidence that the motivations to be nice and honest in the narrative 
evaluation in the study are significantly related to Narrative Evaluation Favorability (using the 
Narrative Evaluation Favorability measure from Table 1).  Specifically, motivation to be nice is 
positively related with Narrative Evaluation Favorability (tdf=142=3.731, two-tailed p<.01), and 
motivation to be honest is negatively related with Narrative Evaluation Favorability (tdf=142=-
1.480, one-tailed p=.071). These findings are consistent with my expectations that supervisors 





1.4.3.3 Understanding the Relationship Between Ratings and Narratives 
 For participants in conditions that require both a rating and a narrative, I ask multiple 
questions to capture the perspectives of participants on the relationship between ratings and 
narratives. They respond with their agreement on an 11-point scale (-5-Completely Disagree to 5-
Completely Agree) to the following four questions: (1) “I felt the need to make my rating and 
written evaluation consistent with each other”, (2) “My rating and written evaluation were 
different from each other”, (3) ”Providing a rating gave me the ability to be more honest in my 
written evaluation”, and (4) ”Providing a written evaluation gave me the ability to be more honest 
in my rating.” On average, participants reported they felt the need to make the rating and 
narrative evaluation consistent with each other (mean=3.2, μ0=0, tdf=69=11.451, two-tailed p<.01), 
their rating and written evaluation were not different from each other (mean=-2.143, μ0=0, tdf=69=-
6.405, two-tailed p<.01), they felt that providing the rating gave them the ability to be more 
honest in the narrative evaluation (mean=2.043, μ0=0, tdf=69=7.713, two-tailed p<.01), and they 
felt that providing the written evaluation gave them the ability to be more honest in the rating 
(mean=2.229, μ0=0, tdf=69=7.683, two-tailed p<.01). Overall, the responses to question (1) and (2) 
suggest that participants tend to match their ratings and narrative evaluations consistent with the 
theory presented for H2b. Although the responses to questions (3) and (4) seem consistent with 
some form of psychological licensing as suggested in H2a, the responses to question (1) and (2) 
make it less likely that participants are using narrative evaluations to achieve one goal and ratings 
to achieve another goal as predicted by strategic psychological licensing.  
 I continue by analyzing whether the responses to these four questions differ by 
experimental condition. In an untabulated regression, I find that responses to question (1) differ 
by Evaluation Purpose with participants in the coaching condition (relative to the bonus 
condition) reporting less agreement with the statement that they felt the need to make the rating 
and narrative consistent with each other (difference=-1.493, tdf=67=-2.253, two-tailed p=0.0275). 





Evaluation Purpose with participants in the coaching condition (relative to the bonus condition) 
reporting more agreement with the statement that their rating and narrative evaluation were 
different from each other (difference=2.113, tdf=67=2.677, two-tailed p=0.009). Responses to 
question (3) and (4) were not significantly different by condition (all p’s > 0.33). The responses 
to question (1) and (2) provide some evidence that the perceived need to match ratings and 
narrative evaluations is stronger when compensation contracting (e.g., a bonus) is affected by the 
evaluation rather than when the evaluation is only used for coaching. 
 At the end of the experiment, I asked participants three more questions to understand the 
order they filled out the parts of the evaluation, their perceptions of the relative importance of the 
rating and narrative, and the relative thought and effort they put into the rating and narrative. 
Participants responded on 11-point scales with labels of 0-Written evaluation first (or written 
evaluation is clearly more important or 100% written evaluation effort) and 10-Numerical Rating 
first (or numerical rating is clearly more important or 100% numerical rating effort). On average, 
participants stated they filled out the rating before the narrative evaluation (mean=7.057, μ0=5, 
tdf=69=4.447, two-tailed p<.01), believed the narrative was more important than the rating 
(mean=2.471, μ0=5, tdf=69=-8.664, two-tailed p<.01), and put more thought and effort into the 
narrative evaluation compared to the rating (mean=2.157, μ0=5, tdf=69=-12.177, two-tailed p<.01). 
This evidence is consistent with expectations that people believe the narrative evaluations are 
very important (Smither and Walker 2004). Since the design of this study places the numerical 
rating above the narrative evaluation on the page, I expected participants to fill out the rating first. 
This allowed me to focus my study on the impact of ratings on narratives rather than the other 
way around. 
1.4.3.4 Analysis of Ratings 
In the experiment, I also captured three additional conditions (72 additional participants 
from the same population) that were not discussed in the primary analysis. In these conditions, 





the three Evaluation Purpose conditions. Using these 3 additional conditions along with the three 
“with rating” conditions that also provide narrative evaluations, I run an ANOVA on the 
supervisors’ ratings with Evaluation Purpose, whether a narrative evaluation is required or not, 
and the interaction between these two variables as factors. I find no significant effects 
(untabulated, all p’s > 0.158). Although this study was not focused on establishing whether the 
presence of narrative evaluations affect numerical ratings, I note that I fail to find evidence that 
narrative evaluations influence ratings. However, these findings should be taken with caution as I 
expected the Evaluation Purpose variable to influence numerical ratings but failed to find 
evidence of an Evaluation Purpose effect. I expected to find ratings to be higher when numerical 
ratings are used in the control system (either for coaching or bonus purposes) compared to when 
the rating has no purpose and is kept private. 
1.5 Conclusions 
 Understanding the effects of ratings on narrative evaluations is particularly important and 
timely given the push to remove subjective performance ratings in practice. Using an experiment, 
I investigate the effects of ratings and the purpose of evaluations on narrative evaluations using a 
laboratory experiment. I fail to find evidence for much of my theory. Although I do find some 
evidence that the presence of social costs from either an employee feedback or compensation 
contracting purpose do increase the favorability of narrative evaluations relative to a private 
evaluation (consistent with leniency effects due to social costs), I fail to find evidence that ratings 
affect narrative evaluations. Specifically, I fail to find evidence of the predicted interaction 
between ratings and the evaluation purpose on narrative evaluation favorability. Using theories on 
goal attainment in performance appraisal, psychological licensing, and process accountability, I 
predicted supervisors would attempt to satisfy goals of honesty and social cost reduction through 
the means available to them. I built theory suggesting that the way in which managers seek to 
satisfy those goals with narrative evaluations depends on whether they also give a rating and what 





evidence of supervisors seeking a psychological license to free up their ability to be honest in 
narrative evaluations thereby satisfying both honesty and social cost reduction goals. Due to 
additional process accountability and the unambiguous nature of ratings, I predicted the presence 
of rating would increase leniency in narrative evaluations when the evaluation is used to 
administer a bonus. However, I failed to find evidence supporting these theories in this 
experiment. 
 This study identifies some challenges with investigating this research question that I 
attempt to overcome in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. The first challenge identified is cleanly 
manipulating the Evaluation Purpose while effectively helping participants understand the 
manipulation. The second challenge for this study is the noise inherent in a qualitative dependent 
variable like narrative evaluations. Upon visual inspection of the individual narrative evaluations, 
I note that the participants had vastly different methods of completing the narrative evaluations. 
This heterogeneity is understandable given the large spread of ages in my sample (min=21 years 
old, max=62 years old). Since narrative evaluations are inherently noisy, minimizing individual 
differences is critical to reduce the error variance sufficiently to detect differences between 
conditions. Noise in the dependent variable is likely to be one of the reasons for the failure to 
detect statistically significant results in this study. 
In Chapter 2, I present a follow-up study that seeks to address these two major concerns. 
The goal of this follow-up study is still to understand the effects of ratings on narrative 
evaluations. To address the issues with Evaluation Purpose, I replace the Evaluation Purpose 
variable with a directional goal manipulation that is easier for participants to understand but still 
provides a goal for them to achieve which I expect to affect judgments. To address the issues with 
heterogeneity of participants causing insurmountable error variance, I use a more homogenous 






1.6 Figures and Tables for Chapter 1 
 
FIGURE 1 - Graphical Representation of Hypotheses 1 and 2 
   
 
This graph displays the predicted pattern for Narrative Evaluation Favorability by experimental condition. 
All participants (acting as supervisors) provided a narrative evaluation of the employee. The dependent 
variable, Narrative Evaluation Favorability, captures the overall favorability of the narrative evaluation 
provided by the supervisor. Rating Type was manipulated by requiring some participants to provide a 
numerical performance rating (Rating) of employee performance while other did not provide a rating (No 
Rating).  Evaluation Purpose was manipulated as No Purpose, Bonus, and Coaching. In the Bonus 
condition, the evaluation is provided by the supervisor was sent to a boss and used to decide whether the 
employee received a bonus. In the Coaching condition, the evaluation is only provided to the employee and 
is used just for coaching. In the No Purpose condition, the evaluation is kept private and not shown to the 
boss or the employee. 
Specific Predictions 
H1a predicts that the two No Rating conditions will be higher than the No Purpose (Control) condition. 
H1b predicts that the No Rating/Bonus condition will be higher than the No Rating/Coaching condition. 
H2a predicts that the Rating/Coaching condition will be lower than the No Rating/Coaching condition. 

















FIGURE 2 - Graph of Cell Means for Narrative Evaluation Favorability as Manually Coded 
on 101-Point Scale 
 
 
This graph displays the means for Narrative Evaluation Favorability by experimental condition (See Table 
1). All participants (acting as supervisors) provided a narrative evaluation of the employee. The dependent 
variable, Narrative Evaluation Favorability, is a measure of the favorability of each supervisor’s narrative 
performance evaluation as coded by the author on a scale from 0 to 100 with 0 labeled as “Far Below 
Expectations” and 100 as “Far Above Expectations”. Rating Type was manipulated by requiring some 
participants to provide a numerical performance rating (Rating) of employee performance while other did 
not provide a rating (No Rating).  Evaluation Purpose was manipulated as No Purpose, Bonus, and 
Coaching. In the Bonus condition, the evaluation is provided by the supervisor was sent to a boss and used 
to decide whether the employee received a bonus. In the Coaching condition, the evaluation is only 
provided to the employee and is used just for coaching. In the No Purpose condition, the evaluation is kept 































FIGURE 3 - Graph of Cell Means for Narrative Evaluation Favorability Coded as the 




This graph displays the means for Narrative Evaluation Favorability by experimental condition (See Table 
2). All participants (acting as supervisors) provided a narrative evaluation of the employee. The dependent 
variable, Narrative Evaluation Favorability, is a measure of the favorability of each supervisor’s narrative 
performance evaluation as coded using the Sentiment score provided by the Natural Language 
Understanding software from IBM Watson. Rating Type was manipulated by requiring some participants to 
provide a numerical performance rating (Rating) of employee performance while other did not provide a 
rating (No Rating).  Evaluation Purpose was manipulated as No Purpose, Bonus, and Coaching. In the 
Bonus condition, the evaluation is provided by the supervisor was sent to a boss and used to decide whether 
the employee received a bonus. In the Coaching condition, the evaluation is only provided to the employee 
and is used just for coaching. In the No Purpose condition, the evaluation is kept private and not shown to 
































TABLE 1 – Analysis of Narrative Evaluation Favorability as Manually Coded on 101-Point 
Scale 
 
Panel A: Narrative Evaluation Favorability Mean (Standard Deviation) [Sample Size] 
 Rating Type  
Evaluation 
Purpose No Rating Rating Overall 
No Purpose 38.46 37.35 37.91 
 (11.10) (9.43) (10.22) 
 [24] [23] [47] 
Bonus 42.38 45.45 43.79 
 (8.12) (14.94) (11.71) 
 [26] [22] [48] 
Coaching 46.08 46.76 46.43 
 (16.20) (13.61) (14.78) 
 [24] [25] [49] 
Overall 42.31 43.26 42.77 
 (12.39) (13.35) (12.83) 
 [74] [70] [144] 
 
Panel B: Two-way ANOVA Model of Narrative Evaluation Favorability 
Source of Variation SS df F p-value 
Intercept 262382 1 1675.928 <.01 
Evaluation Purpose 1829 2 5.840 <.01 
Rating Type 28 1 0.177 0.675 
Evaluation Purpose X Rating Type 104 2 0.333 0.718 







Panel C: Follow-up simple effects tests to investigate H1a and H1b 
Simple Effect Estimate tdf=138 p 
Coaching vs. No Purpose (Without Rating) 7.625 2.111 0.037 
Bonus vs. No Purpose (Without Rating) 3.926 1.109 0.270 
Bonus vs. Coaching (Without Rating) -3.699 -1.044 0.298 
 
Table Notes - All p-values listed in the table are two-tailed. This table presents descriptive statistics, an 
ANOVA model, and simple effects for Narrative Evaluation Favorability. All participants (acting as 
supervisors) provided a narrative evaluation of the employee. The dependent variable, Narrative 
Evaluation Favorability, is a measure of the favorability of each supervisor’s narrative performance 
evaluation as coded by the author on a scale from 0 to 100 with 0 labeled as “Far Below Expectations” and 
100 as “Far Above Expectations”. Rating Type was manipulated by requiring some participants to provide 
a numerical performance rating (with rating) of employee performance while other did not provide a rating 
(no rating).  Evaluation Purpose was manipulated as No Purpose, Bonus, and Coaching. In the Bonus 
condition, the evaluation is provided by the supervisor was sent to a boss and used to decide whether the 
employee received a bonus. In the Coaching condition, the evaluation is only provided to the employee and 
is used just for coaching. In the No Purpose condition, the evaluation is kept private and not shown to the 






TABLE 2 – Analysis of Narrative Evaluation Favorability Coded as the Sentiment Score 
Provided by IBM Watson Software 
 
Panel A: Narrative Evaluation Favorability Mean (Standard Deviation) [Sample Size] 
 Rating Type  
Evaluation 
Purpose No Rating Rating Overall 
No Purpose 0.371 0.235 0.304 
 (0.457) (0.553) (0.505) 
 [24] [23] [47] 
Bonus 0.454 0.358 0.410 
 (0.423) (0.507) (0.461) 
 [26] [22] [48] 
Coaching 0.559 0.473 0.515 
 (0.385) (0.440) (0.412) 
 [24] [25] [49] 
Overall 0.461 0.359 0.411 
 (0.424) (0.503) (0.465) 
 [74] [70] [144] 
 
Panel B: Two-way ANOVA Model of Narrative Evaluation Favorability 
Source of Variation SS df F p-value 
Intercept 23.945 1 112.145 <.01 
Evaluation Purpose 1.091 2 2.555 0.081 
Rating Type 0.401 1 1.876 0.173 
Evaluation Purpose X Rating Type 0.016 2 0.038 0.963 







Panel C: Follow-up simple effects tests to investigate H1a and H1b 
Simple Effect Estimate tdf=138 p 
Coaching vs. No Purpose (Without Rating) 0.189 1.413 0.160 
Bonus vs. No Purpose (Without Rating) 0.084 0.639 0.524 
Bonus vs. Coaching (Without Rating) -0.105 -0.802 0.424 
 
Table Notes - All p-values listed in the table are two-tailed. This table presents descriptive statistics, an 
ANOVA model, and simple effects for Narrative Evaluation Favorability. All participants (acting as 
supervisors) provided a narrative evaluation of the employee. The dependent variable, Narrative 
Evaluation Favorability, is a measure of the favorability of each supervisor’s narrative performance 
evaluation as coded using the Sentiment score provided by the Natural Language Understanding software 
from IBM Watson. Each observation receives a score from -1 to 1 with higher numbers representing more 
positive word content. Rating Type was manipulated by requiring some participants to provide a numerical 
performance rating (with rating) of employee performance while other did not provide a rating (no rating).  
Evaluation Purpose was manipulated as No Purpose, Bonus, and Coaching. In the Bonus condition, the 
evaluation is provided by the supervisor was sent to a boss and used to decide whether the employee 
received a bonus. In the Coaching condition, the evaluation is only provided to the employee and is used 













 In the recent upheaval of traditional performance appraisal systems, some high-profile 
companies have removed numerical performance ratings from their appraisal process (Rock and 
Jones 2015; Silverman 2016). While the benefits of this removal are questioned by some 
proponents of ratings because they believe ratings are useful despite having faults (Adler et al. 
2016), we don’t know how ratings (or the lack of ratings) impact the narrative evaluations 
commonly provided to employees as part of the management control system. This practical 
dilemma facing companies provokes an interesting question. How does quantifying a subjective 
performance evaluation with a rating affect detailed subjective narrative evaluations that 
traditionally accompany the ratings? Previous research on performance evaluation focuses almost 
exclusively on the performance rating as the outcome of interest, leaving the narrative evaluation 
under-researched (Wilson 2010; Speer 2018). I perform a controlled experiment to fill this gap in 
practical and theoretical knowledge regarding the effects of quantifying a subjective performance 
evaluation on narrative performance evaluations.  
 Subjective performance evaluations provide a way for firms to measure, store, and use 
information about employee performance that is difficult to objectively measure. Subjectively 
interpreting raw performance information into summarized evaluations provides information for 
use in the firms’ management control systems. Although numerical subjective performance 
measures have historically played a significant role in determining important outcomes like the 
administration of compensation contracts (Bol 2008), these ratings are not without issues. At 
times, these ratings have been shown to be influenced by contextual features common in business 
environments (e.g., knowledge of employee performance on different tasks, see Bol and Smith 





concerns about the general usefulness of performance ratings are at the center of the debate over 
getting rid of performance ratings (Adler et al. 2016). The collective knowledge of the content of 
narrative evaluations and potential bias in these narratives is limited (Wilson 2010; Speer 2018). 
As formal evaluations affect compensation and career outcomes for employees and provide 
feedback to employees on their performance, bias in performance evaluations can impact a firm’s 
ability to maximize employee motivation, satisfaction, and performance (Ittner, Larcker, and 
Meyer 2003). 
Previous research on performance ratings asserts that supervisors often have implicit or 
explicit goals that lead them away from accurate evaluations (Murphy and Cleveland 1995). 
When supervisors have directional goals to either give a higher or lower evaluation to an 
employee, motivated reasoning theory predicts they will attempt to rationalize biased behavior 
while maintaining a belief they are being objective (Kunda 1990). I expect this motivated 
reasoning process to affect the overall favorability of narrative evaluations with positive 
(negative) directional goals leading to more (less) favorable narrative evaluations than is 
warranted by actual employee performance. In other words, I expect narrative evaluations to be 
impacted by the directional goals.  
In isolation (e.g., in evaluations without numerical ratings), motivated reasoning theory 
predicts narrative evaluations are biased by directional goals. However, research comparing 
numbers (with context-specific labels to provide meaning) and words suggests that use of number 
and words to communicate ideas may be affected differently by directional goals (Daft and 
Wiginton 1979; Piercey 2009). As a lower variety language, numerical rating scales are highly 
context-specific and have a limited number of interpretations. As a higher variety language, 
general verbal expression can be used for a variety of situations which makes it more ambiguous 
in its meaning (i.e., has a larger number of possible interpretations) (Daft and Wiginton 1979). 
This reduced ambiguity and limited freedom of interpretation for numerical rating scales reduces 





other words, the lack of “wiggle room” when interpreting the meaning of numerical ratings 
makes it relatively difficult to give a preference-consistent rating and still maintain the necessary 
“illusion of objectivity” (Kunda 1990). Since I expect the ratings supervisors provide to be more 
resistant to the effects of directional goals, supervisors’ narrative evaluations will be constrained 
by these relatively objective ratings due to their perceived need to match the message of the rating 
with the narrative evaluation (David 2013; Erdogan 2002; Kunda 1990). The end result is a less 
preference-consistent narrative evaluation when the supervisor also has to provide a numerical 
rating. 
To address my research question and test these expectations, I perform a 2x2 between-
subjects experiment manipulating rating type and directional goal where undergraduate business 
student participants take the role of a supervisor at a hypothetical company and evaluate an 
employee’s performance. After each participant views a video of the employee’s performance, 
they must fill out a performance evaluation for the employee. Since I am focused on 
understanding how narrative evaluations change under different conditions, all participants 
provide a narrative evaluation. The rating type is manipulated such that the evaluation either 
requires the participant to assign a numerical rating to the employee’s performance or does not 
require a rating. I manipulate directional goal as either a positive or negative evaluation goal by 
providing advice from the participant’s hypothetical boss. In the positive (negative) goal, the boss 
describes historical evaluation behavior in the company as being too harsh (nice) and requests 
that the participant be honest but realize the need to be more nice (harsh). The dependent variable 
of interest is the Narrative Evaluation Favorability measured using the average of two 
independent coders’ judgments of the favorability of each narrative evaluation.  
 In my experiment, I find evidence that the favorability of narrative evaluations is affected 
by directional goals. Also, the effect of directional goals on narrative evaluation favorability is 
reduced when supervisors must also provide a numerical rating. This evidence is consistent with 





directional goal due to motivated reasoning, but the act of rating an employee on a scale 
constrains that motivated reasoning in the narrative evaluation. These findings suggest that firms 
using ratingless evaluations may have narrative evaluations more affected by supervisors’ 
directional goals than firms with narrative evaluations that also require numerical ratings.  
 This study contributes to the heated debate on the removal of performance ratings (Adler 
et al. 2016; CEB 2016; Cappelli and Tavis 2016) by providing nuanced insight into one potential 
impact of this trend. First, I show that narrative evaluations are affected by directional goals. So, 
justifying removal of ratings due to inaccuracy may be unjustified as the narrative evaluations are 
also affected by evaluator preferences. In addition, I show the traditional method of providing a 
rating along with the narrative evaluation reduces the effects of directional goals on narrative 
evaluations. This insight should be useful to practitioners weighing options for changing their 
performance evaluation process. 
 I also contribute to the research stream investigating subjective performance evaluation 
by deepening the collective understanding of factors that affect narrative evaluations. Subjective 
narrative evaluations have received very little attention in the performance evaluation literature 
(Wilson 2010; Speer 2018). This study provides evidence that narrative evaluations are not 
simply qualitative representations of their quantitative counterparts. Instead, they are affected by 
the process of giving ratings. This study also contributes specifically to a management accounting 
audience because it investigates how subjective measurement by supervisors impacts their 
qualitative evaluation of the employee. While a recent study in management accounting 
investigates how qualitative feedback information (e.g., causal words) impacts the recipient 
(Loftus and Tanlu 2018), my study is the first study in accounting to my knowledge that 
investigates the determinants of subjective narrative information in the control system. 
 I also extend the management accounting literature on performance feedback more 
generally by looking into determinants of performance feedback rather than outcomes of 





feedback on employee effort (e.g., Hannan, Krishnan, and Newman 2008; Hannan, McPhee, 
Newman, and Tafkov 2013; Casas-Arce, Lourenço, and Asís Martínez-Jerez 2017), very little has 
investigated how managers determine what performance feedback to give. 
 Last, I contribute to the broader accounting literature on narrative communication (e.g., 
Li 2008; Asay, Libby, and Rennekamp 2018; Bentley 2019). These studies investigate how 
agents communicate with principals using narrative reports and how it affects the agents and 
principals. I extend the literature by investigating how principals communicate using narrative 
reports to agents. Specifically, I investigate how principals’ narrative evaluations of agents are 
affected by a need to assign quantitative ratings. 
 This paper continues with Section II establishing the background and developing the 
hypotheses. Section III and Section IV describe the methodology used to investigate the research 
question and the results of the study, respectively. Section V concludes the paper.  
2.2 Background and Hypotheses 
2.2.1 Background on Subjective Performance Evaluation 
“Management accounting systems facilitate decision making by collecting and reporting 
relevant information for alternatives being considered” (Swieringa and Weick 1981). Guided by 
the value-added principle, firms measure and use information that helps them run a successful 
business (Edmonds, Edmonds, Edmonds, Edmonds, and Olds 2020). Measuring and evaluating 
the performance of the firm, business units, projects, and employees are a critical purpose of 
management accounting systems. Managing employee performance is on the minds of leaders in 
prominent accounting firms like Deloitte (Buckingham and Goodall 2015). This study focuses 
specifically on evaluating employee performance. To manage employee performance, firms need 
to measure performance and compare it to expectations. When it is difficult to objectively 
measure performance, subjective evaluations are often used to provide essential information to 
the management control system. This subjective performance evaluation fills in gaps left by 





Subjective performance evaluation plays a role in compensation contracting through its use in 
performance-related decisions like promotion, bonus allocation, and raise determination (Bol 
2008). Research in management accounting has provided important insights into the use of 
subjectivity in these types of compensation contracting decisions (e.g., Bol 2011; Bol and Smith 
2011; Chen, Jermias, and Panggabean 2016).  
Subjective performance evaluation also fills a feedback role in control systems by 
providing crucial information on employee performance to the employee for development and to 
better understand how their performance compares to firm expectations (London 2003). The 
feedback literature in management accounting largely focuses on how different characteristics of 
objective feedback (e.g., feedback not influenced by supervisor subjectivity) impact employee 
performance. Recent studies investigating this objective feedback include those on relative 
performance information (Hannan et al. 2008; Hannan et al. 2013) and absolute performance 
information (Casas-Arce et al. 2017). While these studies emphasize the importance of feedback 
in management accounting, they focus on information that is not subjectively generated by 
supervisors. However, performance that is difficult to measure objectively will still need to be 
subjectively evaluated by supervisors to give employees the feedback they need and serve as the 
basis of compensation contracting decisions. Thus, understanding determinants of subjective 
feedback is important because of its effects on firm decision-making (e.g., compensation 
contracting) and employee development.  
 While the past literature on subjective performance evaluation has focused almost 
exclusively on numerical performance information, narrative or verbal evaluations play an 
important role in control systems. In traditional performance appraisal used for compensation 
contracting, supervisors commonly provide both performance ratings and narrative evaluations of 
employee performance (Gorman, Meriac, Roch, Ray, and Gamble 2017). The content of these 
narrative summaries remains a new and under-researched area of performance evaluation (Speer 





evaluation than the numerical rating (Smither and Walker 2004). Narrative performance 
evaluations allow for richness and nuance unavailable using performance ratings that can be 
useful to employees and decisionmakers. Given the importance of narrative evaluations in 
practice and the recent removals of performance ratings mentioned in the introduction of this 
paper, understanding how narrative evaluations change with and without performance ratings is a 
timely and important question. 
2.2.2 Issues with Subjective Performance Evaluation 
 To understand how performance ratings might impact narrative performance evaluations, 
I rely on the goal attainment framework of subjective performance evaluation presented by 
Murphy and Cleveland (1995). One of the important tenets of this framework is that supervisors 
can have goals besides being perfectly accurate in their evaluations. These goals can result in 
biases. In the accounting literature, a variety of biases for numerical performance ratings have 
been identified including: leniency and compression (Moers 2005), previous knowledge of 
employee performance (Bol and Smith 2011; Tan and Jamal 2001), part-time status (White 
2019), employee’s previous evaluation (Woods 2012), inconsistent use of subjectivity in balanced 
scorecard evaluations (Ittner et al. 2003), and favoritism (Du, Tang, and Young 2012). 
 Biased performance information is a concern for both compensation contracting and 
employee feedback in the firm. For compensation contracting, biased evaluations make it more 
difficult to fairly distribute contracted rewards and make other personnel decisions like 
promotion, which can impact employee motivation negatively (Bol, Kramer, and Maas 2016). For 
feedback, biased evaluations compromise opportunities for employees to develop and learn. Since 
performance feedback information has long since been considered useful for performance 
improvement (Kluger and DiNisi 1996), poor quality performance information has the potential 
to restrict employee development and success. 
 The investigation of performance evaluation biases in accounting has focused exclusively 





measured by how high or how low the evaluation is on a scale for a given employee. Alternative 
constructs of importance in the performance evaluation context include internal consistency and 
interrater agreement, among others (Murphy and Cleveland 1995). To maintain comparability to 
ratings and the previous literature, my construct of interest in this study is the overall favorability 
of the narrative content10. Narrative evaluation favorability is the holistic picture (based on the 
narrative) of how well the individual performed, with more favorable evaluations indicating 
better performance and less favorable evaluations indicating worse performance. In this study, I 
focus on building theory for factors that affect narrative evaluation favorability. 
2.2.3 Motivated Reasoning 
 Murphy and Cleveland (1995) suggest that inaccurate ratings are not necessarily evidence 
of an inability to accurately judge performance due to limited understanding of the performance 
context or lack of ability to encode and understand the information. Instead, inaccurate ratings are 
evidence that supervisors have goals other than being perfectly accurate in evaluations. If 
someone’s goals push them away from accuracy or neutrality, the goals can be considered 
directional on either side of accurate. Directional goals are goals either explicitly or implicitly 
held by a person that motivate a person “to arrive at a particular, directional conclusion” (Kunda 
1990). In accounting settings, a variety of directional goals exist and have been shown to affect 
judgments. Examples include directional goals to make audit judgments consistent with a 
partner’s preference (Wilks 2002; Piercey 2009; Peecher, Piercey, Rich, and Tubbs 2010), to 
make money due to increasing or decreasing investment value based on investment position 
(Hales 2007), to make forecasts consistent with incentives (Bradshaw, Lee, and Peterson 2016), 
and to be viewed as competent by themselves and peers (Tayler 2010). In a performance 
evaluation setting, directional goals can take the form of a directional preference to provide an 
 
10 Other potentially interesting constructs for detecting variation in narrative evaluations include accuracy 






evaluation describing a specific level of employee performance. For example, a supervisor might 
have a vested interest in the success of an employee that the supervisor personally hired. When 
the time comes to evaluate the employee’s performance, the supervisor may have an implicit or 
explicit goal to evaluate this employee as having high performance to manage perceptions of the 
supervisor’s ability to hire and mentor employees. Similarly, supervisors can have negative 
evaluation goals. For example, a supervisor may have an implicit or explicit goal to evaluate an 
employee negatively to confirm a previously held belief about the employee stemming from a 
stereotype (e.g., race, gender).  
To understand the potential impact of directional goals on narrative evaluation 
favorability, I appeal to the literature on motivated reasoning. Kunda (1990) suggests that 
individuals with directional goals will attempt to reason their way to judgments that are consistent 
with their desired conclusion. Thus, in the presence of relatively complex and ambiguous 
information like in a subjective performance evaluation scenario, individuals will have enough 
leeway to reach their desired conclusion through rational justification. This allows them to 
“maintain an illusion of objectivity” (Kunda 1990) while still achieving their directional goal. In 
other words, they believe they are being accurate and unbiased even when they are not. Research 
finds this rationalization process is largely unconscious making it particularly worrisome for 
decision quality (Wilks 2002; Piercey 2009). Given a directional goal to evaluate an employee 
positively (negatively), I expect the favorability of the supervisor’s narrative evaluation to be 
more favorable (less favorable), thereby attempting to satisfy the supervisor’s directional goal.  
H1: The favorability of supervisors’ narrative evaluations is higher when they have a 
positive directional goal relative to a negative directional goal.   
While H1 considers whether the narrative evaluations themselves are affected by 
directional goals, it does not consider the impact of ratings on the favorability of narrative 





performance on a numerical scale may impact the directional preference effects present in 
narrative evaluations. 
2.2.4 Reasonableness Constraints – Numerical Rating 
 To this point, I have focused on the presence of motivated reasoning in narrative 
evaluations. However, traditional performance evaluations include both a numerical rating and a 
narrative evaluation (Gorman et al. 2017). Thus, it is important to consider how motivated 
reasoning might affect the favorability of ratings and narrative evaluations differently. Daft and 
Wiginton (1979) suggest that communication methods in organizations differ along the 
dimension of language variety with the spectrum of language variety ranging from high to low. 
High variety language (e.g., art and body language) is characterized by its ambiguity which 
allows it to express a great variety of complex concepts, but at the same time allows it to be 
interpreted in many ways. Low variety language (e.g., analytical mathematics) is more precise 
which makes the specific language useful in only a narrow set of circumstances. This language 
specificity also reduces the number of possible interpretations. Along Daft and Wiginton’s (1979) 
proposed spectrum, “general verbal expression” is considered a higher variety language than 
“linguistic variable (semantic differential, Likert Scale).” Being a high variety language, general 
verbal expression has significant variety to communicate many things in many ways. This 
freedom of interpretation by both author and reader introduces ambiguity about what is meant by 
a specific verbal expression. Narrative evaluations use general verbal expression. A numerical 
rating which usually takes the form of a scale with meaning derived from scale labels is a 
relatively low variety language. Since rating scales are a lower variety language, there is less 
room for either the rater or the ratee to misinterpret the meaning of a given numerical rating. This 
concept has been specifically applied to performance evaluation ratings and narratives in a 
thought piece by Brutus (2010). Brutus provided some initial theoretical footing for why we 





versus narrative portion). However, Brutus (2010) only considers the context of simultaneously 
presented ratings and narratives. So, Brutus does not consider how narratives might differ with 
and without ratings. In my study, I compare a narrative without a rating to a narrative with a 
rating. 
 The effects of ambiguity on decision making has been investigated in multiple accounting 
contexts with the general finding being that increased ambiguity in decision-relevant information 
allows greater flexibility to reach desired conclusions. Studies find that vagueness in financial 
accounting standards and tax law can lead auditors and tax professionals to take more aggressive, 
client-supporting positions (Hackenbrack and Nelson 1996; Spilker, Worsham, and Prawitt 
1999). Similar findings in investor decision-making show that investors make more preference-
consistent judgments when they receive management forecast guidance as a range rather than a 
point estimate. These studies describe how ambiguity in the information received by the decision 
maker affects decision-making. My study focuses instead on how the ambiguity of the 
information communication method (narrative versus rating) used by the decision-maker affects 
the decision makers own judgments. The accounting studies most similar to my study focus on 
the differences between verbal probability phrases (e.g., “probable”) and numerical probabilities 
in accounting settings. These studies find that verbal probability statements commonly used in 
accounting standards (e.g., “remote”) are vague and allow a variety of interpretations (Amer, 
Hackenbrack, and Nelson 1994, 1995; Cuccia, Hackenbrack, and Nelson 1995; Piercey 2009). 
While no differences in tax accountants’ decisions were detected between a numerical and verbal 
probability standards in Cuccia, Hackenbrack, and Nelson (1995), they find evidence of 
accountants primarily using the flexibility in interpreting the meaning of the standard to achieve 
their goals when the standard used a verbal probability. One major difference between these 
previously discussed studies and my study is that these vague verbal judgments are being 
provided to participants to use to make judgments rather than the participants providing these 





numerical probability judgments and assesses the tendency for these judgments to be impacted by 
directional goals. I describe the findings for this study and its relevant theory below.  
 In a performance evaluation setting, the reduced ambiguity of interpretation for ratings 
(relative to narratives) by both evaluator and evaluatee may impact the judgment’s sensitivity to 
motivated reasoning. In a study comparing numerical and verbal probability judgments in an 
audit setting, Piercey (2009) presents experimental evidence that numerical probability judgments 
are less biased by directional goals than verbal probability judgments. He argues and provides 
evidence that the additional motivated reasoning for verbal probability judgments is driven by the 
ability for the decision maker to “re-define” the meaning of their judgment. This “re-definition” 
allowed the decision makers much more flexibility to make a biased judgment while maintaining 
an “illusion of objectivity” (Kunda 1990). This fits into the conceptual framework provided by 
Daft and Wiginton (1979) that number scales are lower variety communication methods than 
general verbal expression. In a performance evaluation setting, the meaning of a numerical rating 
is precise and permanent which reduces ambiguity of meaning. With limited ambiguity of 
meaning, these ratings are inelastic and difficult to use in the process of making a rational 
judgment consistent with a directional goal. Thus, motivated reasoning will be constrained for 
numerical ratings relative to narrative evaluations. Formally stated, the low variety (inelastic) 
nature of numerical ratings introduces a reasonableness constraint to the motivated reasoning 
process (Kunda 1990).  In this setting, I expect the favorability of narrative evaluations (without a 
rating) to be more impacted by directional goals than will numerical ratings, resulting in less 
preference-consistent numerical ratings. 
 The title of this study poses the question, “Do ratings change the narrative?”  I now build 
theory about how providing a less preference-consistent numerical rating (due to the lower 
language variety) will affect the susceptibility of narrative evaluations that accompany the ratings 
to directional goal effects. Evidence from performance evaluation research suggests that narrative 





rating (David 2013; Erdogan 2002). In the presence of process accountability either to others or 
themselves (to maintain an illusion of objectivity), supervisors may feel pressure to match the 
favorability of the narrative evaluation with the ratings. An inconsistent message between the 
rating and the narrative may present salient evidence to the evaluator that they are being biased in 
one of the forms of evaluation which compromises the illusion of objectivity (Kunda 1990). Once 
the supervisor has determined to give a rating which will be relatively uninfluenced by directional 
goals, the rating plays the role of a reasonableness constraint on the narrative evaluation reducing 
the effect of directional goals on narrative evaluation favorability.  Thus, I expect the favorability 
of the narrative evaluation that accompanies the rating to match the rating’s favorability. This 
matching results in a narrative evaluation that is less affected by directional goals compared to a 
narrative evaluation without a rating. I predict the effect of directional goals on narrative 
evaluation favorability will be smaller when the supervisor must provide a numerical rating along 
with the narrative evaluation. 
H2:  The difference in narrative evaluation favorability between supervisors with a 
positive and a negative directional goal will be smaller when the supervisor is also 
required to give a numerical rating. 
2.3 Methodology 
To test my hypothesis, I administer a 2x2 between-subjects experiment where 
participants act as supervisors in a hypothetical company and evaluate the performance of an 
employee11. I manipulate the participant’s directional goal and whether the participant is required 
to rate the performance of the employee on a numerical scale. All participants provide narrative 
evaluations of the employee’s performance. 
 






 Participants are  189 undergraduate business students at a large public university in the 
Northeastern United States12. 60.9% (38.6%) of participants state they are male (female)13. The 
median age of participants is 19 years old. I chose a participant pool that is appropriate for the 
task (Libby, Bloomfield, and Nelson 2002). In the task, they are required to evaluate the 
performance of a musician. All the participants report listening to music at least a couple of times 
a week with 75.6% of participants reporting they listen to music multiple times a day. Thus, these 
participants are well acquainted with music and can be expected to make reasonable judgments as 
to the quality of a musician’s performance. 
2.3.2 Procedures 
 Participants take the role of a supervisor (titled Cruise Director) in a hypothetical cruise 
ship vacation company. After being filled in on basic information about the company, the 
participant views images of a buffet line and gives narrative feedback on the quality of the work 
done by the dining staff14. Then, the participant is told they will evaluate an employee’s (Tom) 
musical performance from a recent cruise. The participant then reads advice from their boss 
containing a directional goal for the performance evaluation, either positive or negative 
depending on the condition. After reading the form that the evaluation will take, the participant 
views a 3.5 minute video of Tom’s musical performance. Then, the participant evaluates Tom 
using the performance evaluation form based on their condition, narrative evaluation with or 
 
12 Participants received course credit for participating in the research study from their instructor which was 
not the author. 
13 One participant preferred not to provide a response to the gender question. 
14 I included this narrative requirement before the primary task in all conditions to capture individual 
differences in narrative evaluation favorability to use as a covariate in the statistical models. Narrative 
favorability for the feedback to the dining staff was measured using the average judgment of two 
independent coders as described in the “Dependent Variable” section of this paper. As expected, the 
narrative favorability of the feedback given to the dining staff was positively related to the narrative 
evaluation favorability of the primary performance evaluation suggesting that individuals have tendencies 
to write more positively or negatively (µ=0.199, t184=3.055, two-tailed p<0.01). When the narrative 
favorability for the feedback to the dining staff is included in the primary model (ANCOVA and simple 
effects), the results are qualitative similar and inferences remain the same. For ease of presentation and 





without a rating. Finally, participants answer post-experimental questions to help me better 
understand why they behaved the way they did and to collect demographic information.15 
2.3.3 Task Performance Video 
 I used a video of a musical performance for specific experimental design purposes. First, 
a musical performance is considered an inherently subjective task. Since subjectivity is at the 
center of subjective performance evaluation and is important in the theory presented in this study, 
a highly subjective performance context like a musical performance is warranted. Second, real 
world performance evaluations are based on a rich set of information to draw on which allows for 
significant variation in narrative evaluations. Traditionally used experimental instruments for 
testing performance ratings are not sufficiently rich to allow for adequate variation in narrative 
evaluations. To balance the time constraints of participants and the richness of data to evaluate, I 
chose a task that is both brief and rich with data to evaluate. By viewing the performance of a 
single song, evaluators can focus on a variety of aspects: audience interaction, vocal quality, 
instrumentation quality, mistakes, stage presence, etc. This task provides an effective and 
efficient means of testing the hypotheses. Last, music is a task that many people are familiar with. 
It can be difficult to find a sufficient pool of participants that are able to write intelligently about 
and evaluate performance on a specific task. Given the ubiquity of music among university 
students, I was able to efficiently access participants that were reasonably equipped to write about 
an employee’s musical performance.  
2.3.4 Manipulations 
2.3.4.1 Directional Goal 
 Directional goal is manipulated using advice from the participants’ hypothetical boss. 
The theoretical construct of a directional goal is a supervisor either having a goal to be more 
positive or more negative in an evaluation. The advice from the boss exogenously provides 
 





supervisors with a directional goal in their evaluation. I follow prior directional goal research in 
auditing where auditors were instructed by their partner to be pessimistic (conservative) or 
optimistic (aggressive) due to client’s preferences for favorable reporting (Piercey 2009; Peecher 
et al. 2010). To maintain believability in these audit studies, the audit partner provides 
contextually reasonable explanations for these preferences for pessimistic or optimistic 
judgments. Following this pattern, I manipulated directional goals in the following manner. The 
advice in all conditions begins by requesting that the performance evaluations be honest. Then, in 
the positive directional goal condition, the boss describes past experiences where the tendency of 
cruise directors has been to be too harsh in evaluations. The boss then recommends that the 
participant not be too harsh and to pay attention to things that go well in the performance. In the 
negative directional goal, the boss describes past experiences where the tendency of cruise 
directors has been to be too nice in evaluations. The boss then recommends that the participant 
not be too nice and to pay attention to things that do not go well in the performance. This 
directional goal manipulation gives participants a directional goal from their boss to be more 
positive or more negative in their evaluations of the employee’s performance. 
2.3.4.2 Rating Type 
 Rating type is manipulated at two levels. Participants in the no rating condition, No 
Rating, are not asked to provide a numerical rating in their performance evaluation. Participants 
in the rating present condition, Rating, are asked to rate the performance of the employee, Tom, 
on a scale based on their expectations for a professional performer at Riverboat Cruises Inc.16 
They respond on a scale with a number from 1 to 5 with labels of Unacceptable, Below Average, 
Average, Above Average, and Outstanding. In the Rating conditions, the performance rating scale 
 
16 While performance ratings can take the form of absolute or relative formats (like rankings), absolute 
ratings appear to be more commonly used in practice (Gorman et al. 2017). I use an absolute rating scale in 





is presented simultaneously with the narrative evaluation. The rating is at the top of the page and 
the narrative evaluation follows. 
2.3.5 Dependent Variable 
 For narrative evaluations, participants responded to the following prompt, “Please 
provide a written evaluation of your employee, Tom, based on your expectations for a 
professional performer at Riverboat Cruises Inc [Please write a minimum of 250 characters].” 
Participants were forced to write at least 250 characters to ensure that the text responses would be 
long enough to allow for measurable variation in the construct of interest. I use the narrative 
evaluations as the raw material to create the dependent variable. My construct of interest is 
Narrative Evaluation Favorability. I measure this using the judgments of two independent 
coders.17  Coders were given the following instructions, “Please rate each row separately as an 
independent evaluation. How favorable is the evaluation of Tom’s music performance?” They 
rated the favorability of each narrative evaluation on a 1 to 7 Likert scale with 1 being 
Completely Unfavorable and 7 being Completely Favorable. Each coder viewed the narrative 
evaluations and provided a single judgment for each narrative evaluation. The two coders 
completed the assessments independently. Coders did not have access to the performance ratings 
provided by participants in the rating condition.18 The coders showed high agreement. 
Specifically, the Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.909 (t187=29.947, two-tailed p<.01). I also 
test the Intraclass Correlation of the two coders responses. I use the Intraclass Correlation model 
with the following assumptions: twoway random effects model, test for consistency (rather than 
 
17 The two coders were non-author doctoral students in accounting. The coders were blind to the 
experimental condition and made coding judgments of each participant’s response in different random 
orders. 
18 It is possible that participants described a rating in the narrative evaluation. While I chose not to restrict 
the supervisors’ ability to use any means they feel necessary in their narrative evaluations (including 
talking about ratings), it is possible that the mentioning of a rating in the narrative evaluation might unduly 
influence the coders evaluation of narrative evaluation favorability. Eight participants mentioned a 
variation of the word “rating” (e.g., rate, rating) or a number that could be conceived as a rating. I rerun the 
analyses in Table 1, Table 2, and Table 3 dropping these eight participants (untabulated). All results are 





absolute agreement), and the coding will be used for average measures. 19 The Intraclass 
Correlation Coefficient (ICC) is 0.95 with a 95% Confidence Interval for ICC of [0.934, 0.963]. 
This ICC is indicative of excellent reliability of the coders (Cicchetti 1994; Hallgren 2012). I 
average the responses by each of the coders to get the primary dependent variable for this study, 
Narrative Evaluation Favorability. I interpret higher values of Narrative Evaluation Favorability 
as more favorable. Please see the Appendix for two examples narrative evaluations provided by 
participants. 
2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Manipulation Check 
 Before analyzing the primary dependent variable, I assess the effectiveness of the 
Directional Goal manipulation by analyzing responses to the following two questions: (1) “How 
much pressure did you feel to be nice in your evaluation of Tom?” and (2) “How much pressure 
did you feel to be harsh in your evaluation of Tom?”. Participants responded to each of these 
questions on 11-point scales with labels of “No Pressure At All” (0) to “Significant Pressure” 
(10). Participants in the positive directional goal conditions reported higher pressure to be nice 
(mean = 4.989) than participants in the negative directional goal conditions (mean = 4.118, 
difference=0.871, t187=2.147, two-tailed p=0.033). Similarly, participants in the positive 
directional goal conditions reported less pressure to be harsh (mean = 2.958) than participants in 
the negative directional goal conditions (mean = 4.312, difference= -1.353, t187= -3.598, two-
tailed p<.01). These results suggest that the Directional Goal manipulation effectively 
manipulated positive and negative goals between participants.20 While this data suggests the 
Directional Goal manipulation was successful on average, I also check whether each participant 
 
19 I use the “irr” package in R to calculate and statistically test the Intraclass Coefficient. 
20 I did not capture a manipulation check for the Rating manipulation. Unlike manipulations of theoretical 
constructs that represent psychological constructs that may need to be measured to ensure proper 
manipulation of subtle constructs, Rating is an important context-rich task that participants either complete 
or do not complete depending on their experimental condition. I manipulated ratings using a basic 





attended to the directional goal manipulation. At the end of the experiment, I ask participants, 
“Which of the following quotes from your boss did you read?” They see the paragraph of advice 
from the boss in each condition and select which of the two they read. Only five participants 
answered this question regarding Directional Goal incorrectly suggesting most participants 
attended to the manipulation.21 
2.4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
The narrative evaluations produced by participants had a mean (median) number of 
words of 99.624 (83) consisting of a mean (median) of 548.101 (453) characters.22 This content 
was coded for Narrative Evaluation Favorability as described in the “Dependent Variable” 
section of this paper. 
 Before formally testing my hypotheses, I examine the means of the conditions and nature 
of the data for Narrative Evaluation Favorability. Figure 4 contains a graphical representation of 
the means by condition for Narrative Evaluation Favorability. I tabulate the means, standard 
deviations, and sample size of the data in Table 3. The pattern of means appears to be consistent 
with my hypotheses. The mean of the positive directional goal conditions (mean = 4.92) is above 
the mean of the negative directional goal conditions (mean = 3.78).  This pattern is consistent 
with theory that the supervisors’ narrative evaluations were impacted by motivated reasoning. 
Also, the difference between the positive and negative directional goal conditions is smaller in the 
presence of rating (4.56 – 3.97 = 0.59) compared to the difference without ratings (5.23 - 3.52 = 
1.71). This change due the presence of rating appears to be driven by a decrease in favorability 
 
21 In untabulated analyses, I find that inferences remain the same when dropping the five participants that 
answered this question incorrectly. All findings in Table 3, Table 4, and Table 5 replicate when dropping 
the five participants and the results become more statistically significant for some tests. 
22 To investigate whether the length of the narrative evaluations differed based on condition, I performed an 
untabulated ANOVA of the natural log of the number of words in the narrative on Directional Goal, Rating 
Type, and the interaction between the two. I find no differences in number of words by condition (all p’s 
above .20). I perform a similar ANOVA investigating the effects of the manipulated variables on the 






for the positive directional goal (5.23 to 4.56) and an increase in favorability for the negative 
directional goal (3.52 to 3.97). These descriptive results are directionally consistent with H1 and 
H2. 
2.4.3 Hypothesis Tests 
 To formally test the hypotheses, I use a combination of Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) 
and follow-up simple effects tests. The results of the two-way ANOVA of Narrative Evaluation 
Favorability with Directional Goal, Rating Type, and the interaction as factors are reported in 
Table 3, Panel B. I find a significant main effect of Directional Goal on Narrative Evaluation 
Favorability (F1,185=23.41, p<0.01) and a significant interaction between Directional Goal and 
Rating Type on Narrative Evaluation Favorability (F1,185=4.32, p=0.039). This provides some 
evidence supporting H1 and H2. Follow-up simple effect tests provide additional insight into the 
directions of these effects. Without a rating, I find narrative evaluation favorability in the positive 
directional goal condition is higher than in the negative goal condition, on average 
(difference=1.609, t185=4.957, two-tailed p<0.01). I also find a similar significant effect of 
Directional Goal when a rating is present, but the effect is much weaker (difference=0.642, 
t185=1.926, two-tailed p=0.056). In combination, these effects support H1 and shed some initial 
light on H2. The reduced significance of the directional goal effect when a rating is present is 
consistent with theory that ratings reduce the effects of directional goals on the narrative 
evaluation. Since the impact of reasonableness constraints on directional goals depends on the 
direction of the goal, I also test the effects of ratings under positive and negative directional goals 
separately.  The simple effect of including a rating when there is a positive directional goal is 
significantly negative (difference= -0.722, t185= -2.214, two-tailed p=0.028). This provides 
evidence that the act of giving a rating imposes reasonableness constraints on the narrative 





goal.23 In other words, giving a rating reduces the effect of the directional goal on the favorability 
of the narrative evaluation. While not statistically significant, I find that the simple effect of 
including a rating with a negative directional goal fits the pattern predicted by my hypothesis 
(difference= 0.244, t185= 0.737, one-tailed p=0.231). Under a negative directional goal, I expected 
Narrative Evaluation Favorability to be higher when a rating was required relative to no rating. 
This simple effect does not reach conventional levels of significance, but future research may 
investigate this effect further to understand whether the asymmetric magnitude of the effects of 
reasonableness constraints in this study is meaningful and what might cause the asymmetry. 
2.4.4 Supplemental Analyses 
2.4.4.1 Alternative Dependent Variable – Item Analysis 
To better understand the effects of ratings and directional goals on narrative evaluations, I 
consider alternative dependent variables that divide the narrative evaluations into components 
rather than the single holistic measure, Narrative Evaluation Favorability. While the theory in 
this paper is discussed in broad terms about the overall favorability of the content, I expect the 
movement of overall favorability to be driven by the subcomponents of positive comments and 
negative comments in the narrative evaluations. If ratings restrict motivated reasoning in narrative 
evaluations, I expect the number of positive or negative comments in the narrative evaluation to 
be impacted by this restriction. For participants with positive (negative) directional goals, I expect 
those required to give a rating will provide fewer (more) positive comments and more (fewer) 
negative comments compared to those not required to give a rating. 
 
23 As additional evidence that participants narrative evaluations were constrained to matched the 
favorability of the ratings, I find that Narrative Evaluation Favorability and the ratings provided by 
participants in the Rating conditions are significantly correlated (Pearson Correlation = 0.742, 





 I perform item analysis on the narrative evaluations by first dividing each evaluation into 
distinct statements (Smither and Walker 2004). To do this, I went through each narrative 
evaluation, while blind to experimental conditions, and divided the comments into a number of 
distinct statements. Distinct statements do not need to be complete sentences. Some sentences 
contain multiple statements (e.g., “Tom plays guitar and sings very well” is two statements – one 
about his guitar playing and another about his singing ability). Other statements are made of 
multiple sentences, yet constitute a single statement (e.g., “First of all, Tom seemed to be dressed 
too casually for the occasion. He's not dressed poorly, but he's dressing as if he's performing at 
your local pub - this is a professional Cruise service, where higher quality is expected. Maybe not 
a full suit, but I definitely would have liked to have seen Tom wearing khakis, and tuck in his 
shirt.” – This is coded as a single statement). The mean (median) number of statements for the 
sample is 7.49 (7).  
 I coded each statement about Tom’s performance as positive, negative, or neutral. I 
summed the number of positive statements for each evaluation to create Positive Statements and 
summed the number of negative statements for each evaluation to create Negative Statements.  
In Table 4, I present descriptive statistics and the two-way ANOVA of Positive 
Statements with Directional Goal, Rating Type, and the interaction as factors. Consistent with the 
theory for H1, I find a significant main effect of Directional Goal on Positive Statements 
(F1,185=20.01, p<0.01). Looking at the means in Table 4, we see that those participants with a 
positive directional goal included more positive statements in their narrative evaluation. 
However, I fail to find support for an interaction between Directional Goal and Rating Type as 
predicted by the theory in H2 (F1,185=0.601, p=0.439). The simple effect of including a rating 
when there is a positive directional goal is significantly negative as theory would predict with 
ratings reducing the upward effect of the positive directional goal (difference= -0.707, t185= -
1.689, one-tailed p=0.047).  However, the simple effect of including a rating for those with a 





These results do not provide convincing evidence that the effect of directional goals on Positive 
Statements is reduced by the presence of a rating. 
In Table 5, I present descriptive statistics and the two-way ANOVA of Negative 
Statements with Directional Goal, Rating Type, and the interaction as factors. As expected, I find 
a significant main effect of Directional Goal on Negative Statements with participants with a 
negative directional goal including more negative statements in their narrative evaluation, on 
average (F1,185=20.17, p<0.01). I also find a marginally significant interaction between 
Directional Goal and Rating Type, suggesting that the effect of directional goals on the number of 
negative statements in the narrative evaluations depends on whether the supervisor also gives a 
rating (F1,185=3.34, p=0.066). To investigate whether the direction of this interaction is consistent 
with H2, I follow-up the ANOVA with simple effects tests in Table 5, Panel C. Without a rating, 
having a positive directional goal results in a significant decrease in the number of negative 
comments (difference= -1.990, t185= -4.546, two-tailed p<0.01). With a rating, the effect of 
having a positive directional goal is statistically significant but smaller in magnitude (difference= 
-0.828, t185= -1.842, two-tailed p=0.067). Under a positive directional goal, the presence of a 
rating appears to increase the number of negative statements relative to no rating (difference= 
0.618, t185= 1.403, one-tailed p=0.081). This marginally significant effect is consistent with H2 
that predicts supervisors who need to provide a rating will provide narrative evaluations that are 
less aligned with their directional goal. Under a negative directional goal, participants giving a 
rating provided fewer negative comments although the results don’t reach conventional levels of 
significance (difference= -0.544, t185= -1.217, one-tailed p=0.113). The overall pattern of results 
for the number of negative comments is consistent with the theory that narrative evaluations tend 
to be consistent with the supervisor’s directional goal but the effect of directional goals on 





2.4.4.2 Analysis of Ratings 
The theory development for H2 suggests that numerical ratings will be less affected by 
directional goals. Unfortunately, the large number of differences between the numerical scale and 
the coded narrative evaluation favorability makes direct comparisons of magnitude unwise. While 
I have no direct evidence that the numerical ratings were less affected by directional goals, I do 
test whether directionally goals had a measurable effect on the numerical ratings using an 
untabulated ordinal logistic regression24 of numerical rating on Directional Goal. I use ordinal 
logistic regression because the labeled numerical rating scale does not meet the assumptions of an 
interval scale, however the order from 1 to 5 is meaningful with higher numbers reflecting more 
favorable evaluations. I fail to find a significant effect of Directional Goal on the numerical 
rating (β = 0.529, t90 = 1.310, two-tailed p = 0.193). The lack of a detectable effect of Directional 
Goal on numerical ratings when the same manipulation significantly affected the narrative 
evaluations provides some interesting although inconclusive evidence that the numerical ratings 
were more resistant to the effects of directional goals.  
2.4.4.3 Effects of Narratives on Ratings 
The bulk of this paper has discussed the anticipated impact of ratings on narrative 
evaluations. However, one might also be interested in the effects of narrative evaluations on 
ratings. In the primary experiment, I included two additional conditions where participants 
provided a rating, but did not provide a narrative evaluation. These additional 93 participants 
from the same participant pool split across negative and positive conditions are a benchmark to 
compare to the conditions where participants responded to both Rating and Narrative prompts. In 
untabulated analyses using an ordinal logistic regression of the supervisor’s rating of the 
employee on Directional Goal, whether or not the supervisor provides a narrative, and the 
interaction between these two variables, I find no evidence that either of these manipulations or 
 





the interaction affected the performance rating (all p’s>0.40). While the purpose of this study was 
not to investigate the effects of narratives on numerical ratings, I note that no effects were 
detected. Since the study was not designed specifically to test the effects of narrative on ratings, 
these initial findings should not preclude future research from investigating these effects. 
2.4.4.4 Perceived Similarities and Differences between Ratings and Narratives 
In my study, I asked participants in the rating plus narrative evaluation conditions to 
answer additional questions about how they perceived ratings and narrative evaluations. 
Participants responded to the following two questions on 11-point scales (-5 Completely 
Disagree, 0 Neither Agree Nor Disagree, 5 Completely Agree): (1) “I felt the need to make my 
rating and written evaluation consistent with each other” and (2) “My rating and written 
evaluation were different from each other”. Participants reported they tended to agree that they 
needed to make their rating and written evaluations consistent with each other with responses 
being significantly higher than the midpoint of the scale (mean = 3.130, H0: µ=0, t91=14.882, two-
tailed p<.01). Similarly, participants reported they tended to disagree with the statement that their 
rating and written evaluations were different from each other with responses being significantly 
lower than the midpoint of the scale (mean = -2.207, H0: µ=0, t91= -7.691, two-tailed p<.01). 
These results provide evidence that participants view ratings and narrative as telling a similar 
story about employee performance (i.e., they match). 
Since the primary goal of this study was to understand the effects of ratings on narrative 
evaluations, I intentionally presented rating scale at the top of the page with the narrative 
evaluation below it. I asked participants, “Which of the two pieces of the evaluation did you fill 
out first?”, on an 11-point scale (0 Written Evaluation, 5 I filled them out simultaneously, 10 
Numerical Rating). As expected, given the ordering of the two tasks, on average, participants 
suggested they filled out the numerical rating before the written evaluation (mean = 7.065, H0: 
µ=5, t91= 4.899, two-tailed p<.01). To capture their perceptions of importance of the two 





clearly more important, 5 Equally important, 10 Numerical Rating is clearly more important): 
“Which of the two pieces of the evaluation did you think was more important?” They perceive 
written evaluations to be more important than numerical ratings (mean = 1.880, H0: µ=5, t91= -
14.242, two-tailed p<.01). Last, they responded to the following question on an 11-point scale (0 
- 100% Written Evaluation Effort, 5 -Equal Effort, 10 - 100% Numerical Rating Effort): “Which 
of the two pieces of the evaluation did you put more thought and effort into?”. Consistent with 
perceptions of relative importance, participants also suggest they put more thought and effort into 
the narrative evaluation than the numerical rating (mean = 1.924, H0: µ=5, t91= -14.28, two-tailed 
p<.01). While these supplementary questions are not conclusive evidence, they suggest that 
evaluators attempted to match their ratings and narratives, filled out their ratings before the 
narratives, and perceived narratives to be important. These results taken together with previously 
reported findings in this paper tell an intriguing story of unintended consequences. Specifically, 
participants may be surprised to learn that the substantially less important and low effort rating is 
influencing narratives in a significant way. Similarly, from the opposite point of view, 
participants may be surprised by the strong effects of directional goals on their narrative 
evaluations and the ability of a simple rating judgment to reduce this effect. 
2.5 Conclusions 
 Understanding the effects of ratings on narrative evaluations is particularly important 
given the push to remove subjective performance ratings in practice. Using an experiment, I 
investigate the effects of ratings on narrative evaluations using a laboratory experiment. I find 
that the requirement to provide ratings does affect narrative evaluations of employee 
performance, specifically the favorability of those narrative evaluations. While I do find narrative 
evaluations are influenced by directional goals, I also find that requiring an evaluator to provide a 
numerical performance rating reduces the effect of directional goals on narrative evaluation 





evaluation favorability is affected by directional goals, but this effect is reduced in the presence of 
reasonableness constraints (i.e., the rating process). 
 While firms are getting rid of performance evaluations, they may be failing to consider a 
benefit to retaining these performance ratings in their performance management system. The 
tendency for preference-consistent behavior by supervisors in free-form narrative evaluations 
appears to be mitigated by performance ratings.    
 This study suggests interesting areas for future research. In this study, I focus solely on 
one dimension of narrative evaluations, favorability. Given the rich nature of narrative 
evaluations, future research could investigate similar questions using different dimensions of 
narrative evaluation (Doyle 2018). Also, this study establishes narrative performance evaluations 
as an important outcome variable in the management accounting literature. Future research could 
investigate how other control system functions impact subjective narrative evaluations. 
In this study, I selected a specific rating scale and set of labels to be a reasonable 
representation of ratings used in practice. However, the exact rating scale and labels used in firms 
varies depending on the firm’s needs. Rating scales in practice could include more or fewer 
categories, fewer labels, different labels, among other differences from the scale used in my 
study. Future research can investigate whether specific types of scales and labels affect narrative 
evaluations differently. Some firms even avoid the use of numbers but maintain the same labels. I 
argue that these types of rating scales are very similar to numbered scales because it requires a 
summary judgment that group employees into an ordinal category with a specified meaning. 
However, I did not separately manipulate the presence of numbers on the scale. Future research 
can dissect the parts of the scale and investigate whether the effects are driven by a specific piece 








2.6 Appendix – Example Narrative Evaluations from Participants 
 
Example #1 – Negative Goal Condition Example 
Narrative Evaluation Favorability – 2 
Positive Statements – 2 
Negative Statements – 7 
“Overall, I feel like Tom is a good performer, but there were definitely a few glaring issues. First 
of all, Tom seemed to be dressed too casually for the occasion. He's not dressed poorly, but he's 
dressing as if he's performing at your local pub - this is a professional Cruise service, where 
higher quality is expected. Maybe not a full suit, but I definitely would have liked to have seen 
Tom wearing khakis, and tuck in his shirt.   Also, Tom just seemed a bit bored during his 
performance. It is a sadder toned song, but I would have liked to have seen a bit more emotion. 
He was constantly either looking down at his guitar/feet, or he had a blank stare on his face that 
showed no emotion.   Lastly, I feel like Tom sang the song a little too quickly. I know it's a cover, 
but I would have liked to have seen him take it slower to showcase the emotion of the song and 
the power of his voice.” 
 
 
Example #2 – Positive Goal Condition Example 
Narrative Evaluation Favorability – 5.5 
Positive Statements – 5 
Negative Statements – 3 
“I felt as though Tom played a recent and nice song choice. He has a great voice and plays the 
guitar very well. Although it was a good performance, it seemed as though he had to look down at 
the lyrics or guitar chords a lot which interfered with Tom walking around and getting more 
involved with the audience. Also, Tom's beautiful raspy voice would be well accompanied by a 
smile as well as some more emotion and feeling in some of the words. Overall, Tom did a fine 





2.7 Figures and Tables for Chapter 2 





Figure Note – This figure graphically displays the effect of Directional Goal and Rating Type on 
supervisors’ narrative evaluation favorability. The means are described with formal hypothesis tests in 
Table 3. All participants (acting as supervisors) provided a narrative evaluation of the employee. The 
dependent variable, Narrative Evaluation Favorability, is a measure of the favorability of each supervisor’s 
narrative performance evaluation as coded by two independent coders on a 1 to 7 scale. Rating Type was 
manipulated by requiring some participants to provide a numerical performance rating (with rating) of 
employee performance while other did not provide a rating (no rating).  Directional Goal was manipulated 
as Positive or Negative using advice from the participants’ hypothetical boss that recommended being 









TABLE 3 - Analysis of Narrative Evaluation Favorability 
Panel A: Narrative Evaluation Favorability Mean (Standard Deviation) [Sample Size] 
 Rating Type  
Directional Goal No Rating Rating Overall 
Positive 5.28 4.55 4.92 
 (1.34) (1.67) (1.55) 
 [49] [47] [96] 
Negative 3.67 3.91 3.78 
 (1.68) (1.68) (1.68) 
 [48] [45] [93] 
Overall 4.48 4.24 4.36 
 (1.72) (1.70) (1.71) 
 [97] [92] [189] 
 
Panel B: Two-way ANOVA Model of Narrative Evaluation Favorability 
Source of Variation SS df F p-value 
Intercept 3575.5 1 1400.037 <.01 
Directional Goal 59.8 1 23.412 <.01 
Rating Type 2.7 1 1.055 0.306 
Directional Goal x 
Rating Type 11.0 1 4.319 0.039 
Error 472.5 185   
 
Panel C: Simple Effects 
Simple Effect Estimate tdf=185 p 
Effect of Directional Goal with No Rating 1.609 4.957 <.01 
Effect of Directional Goal with Rating 0.642 1.926 0.056 
Effect of Rating with Positive Directional Goal -0.722 -2.214 0.028 
Effect of Rating with Negative Directional Goal 0.244 0.737 0.462 
 
Table Notes - All p-values listed in the table are two-tailed. This table presents descriptive statistics, an 
ANOVA model, and simple effects for Narrative Evaluation Favorability. All participants (acting as 
supervisors) provided a narrative evaluation of the employee. The dependent variable, Narrative 
Evaluation Favorability, is a measure of the favorability of each supervisor’s narrative performance 
evaluation as coded by two independent coders on a 1 to 7 scale. Rating Type was manipulated by requiring 
some participants to provide a numerical performance rating (with rating) of employee performance while 
other did not provide a rating (no rating).  Directional Goal was manipulated as Positive or Negative using 
advice from the participants’ hypothetical boss that recommended being either more nice or more harsh in 






TABLE 4 - Analysis of Number of Positive Statements in Narrative Evaluations 
Panel A: Positive Statements Mean (Standard Deviation) [Sample Size] 
 Rating Type  
Directional Goal No Rating Rating Overall 
Positive 4.90 4.19 4.55 
 (1.88) (1.90) (1.91) 
 [49] [47] [96] 
Negative 3.33 3.09 3.22 
 (2.36) (2.01) (2.19) 
 [48] [45] [93] 
Overall 4.12 3.65 3.89 
 (2.27) (2.02) (2.16) 
 [97] [92] [189] 
 
Panel B: Two-way ANOVA Model of Positive Statements 
Source of Variation SS df F p-value 
Intercept 2839.4 1 676.852 <.01 
Direction Goal 83.95 1 20.012 <.01 
Rating Type 10.67 1 2.544 0.112 
Directional Goal x 
Rating Type 2.52 1 0.601 0.439 
Error 776.08 185   
 
Panel C: Simple Effects 
Simple Effect Estimate tdf=185 p 
Effect of Directional Goal with No Rating 1.565 3.762 <.01 
Effect of Directional Goal with Rating 1.103 2.581 0.011 
Effect of Rating with Positive Directional Goal -0.707 -1.689 0.093 
Effect of Rating with Negative Directional Goal -0.244 -0.575 0.566 
 
Table Notes - All p-values listed in the table are two-tailed. This table presents descriptive statistics, an 
ANOVA model, and simple effects for Positive Statements. All participants (acting as supervisors) 
provided a narrative evaluation of the employee. The dependent variable, Positive Statements, is a count of 
the number of positive statements in each narrative evaluation as coded by the author. Rating Type was 
manipulated by requiring some participants to provide a numerical performance rating (with rating) of 
employee performance while other did not provide a rating (no rating). Directional Goal was manipulated 
as Positive or Negative using advice from the participants’ hypothetical boss that recommended being 






TABLE 5 - Analysis of Number of Negative Statements in Narrative Evaluations 
Panel A: Negative Statements Mean (Standard Deviation) [Sample Size] 
 
 
Panel B: Two-way ANOVA Model of Negative Statements 
Source of Variation SS df F p-value 
Intercept 2343.92 1 504.573 <.01 
Directional Goal 93.69 1 20.169 <.01 
Rating Type 0.06 1 0.014 0.907 
Directional Goal x 
Rating Type 15.93 1 3.430 0.066 
Error 859.39 185   
 
Panel C: Simple Effects 
Simple Effect Estimate tdf=185 p 
Effect of Directional Goal with No Rating -1.990 -4.546 <.01 
Effect of Directional Goal with Rating -0.828 -1.842 0.067 
Effect of Rating with Positive Directional Goal 0.618 1.403 0.162 
Effect of Rating with Negative Directional Goal -0.544 -1.217 0.225 
 
Table Notes - All p-values listed in the table are two-tailed. This table presents descriptive statistics, an 
ANOVA model, and simple effects for Negative Statements. All participants (acting as supervisors) 
provided a narrative evaluation of the employee. The dependent variable, Negative Statements, is a count of 
the number of negative statements in each narrative evaluation as coded by the author. Rating Type was 
manipulated by requiring some participants to provide a numerical performance rating (with rating) of 
employee performance while other did not provide a rating (no rating). Directional Goal was manipulated 
as Positive or Negative using advice from the participants’ hypothetical boss that recommended being 
either more nice or more harsh in their evaluations, respectively. 
  
 Rating Type  
Directional Goal No Rating Rating Overall 
Positive 2.51 3.13 2.81 
 (1.72) (2.46) (2.13) 
 [49] [47] [96] 
Negative 4.50 3.96 4.24 
 (2.21) (2.17) (2.20) 
 [48] [45] [93] 
Overall 3.49 3.53 3.51 
 (2.21) (2.35) (2.27) 
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